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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3Q) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether any existing incident report created pursuant to Utah's care-review 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 (1998), is privileged and not subject to discovery.1 
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to compel production of any existing incident 
report in a Minute Entry dated March 4,2004. R. at 173-75, attached as Exhibit A to 
Addendum. The trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Pack v. Case, 2001 LTApp 232, ^ 16, 30 P.3d 436. The trial court's 
interpretation of Utah's care review statute is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998). The trial court's 
acceptance of the facts set forth in the affidavit supporting application of Utah's care-
review statute is reviewed "under a broad grant of discretion." In re Gen. Determination 
of Rights to Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). 
2. Whether issues regarding further discovery are properly before the Court. 
The Minute Entry appealed from does not address further discovery regarding any 
existing incident report. R. at 173-75. Utah's appellate courts serve the "limited 
function" of reviewing "orders and judgments made by the trial court in the first 
'Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1, -2 and -4 were amended in 2004. Because this suit 
was commenced in 2002, the 1998 version of the statute applies. State ex rel T.M., 2003 
UT App 191,117, 73 P.3d 959. In any event, the 2004 statutory amendments do not 
affect the issues on appeal. 
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instance." Brumley v. Utah State Tax Comm % 868 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994) (denying 
petition for rehearing). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, 
or other data furnished by reason of this chapter, and any 
findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are 
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, 
use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind 
or character. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1998) (attached as Exhibit B to Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or around December 16, 2002, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging medical 
malpractice against Salt Lake Regional Medical Center (the "Hospital"). R. at 10. 
Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents includes a request for each 
incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall while he was a patient 
at the Hospital. R. at 13-14. The Hospital objected to plaintiffs' request for any existing 
incident report on the grounds of the privilege contained in Utah's care-review statute, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1 to - 5. R. at 42-43. 
On October 24, 2003, plaintiffs served a motion to compel production of any 
incident report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's alleged fall ("First Motion to 
Compel"). R. at 58-67. On November 17,2003, the Hospital served its memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. R. at 68-92. Attached to the Hospital's 
memorandum is the affidavit of Linda Wright, who is the Risk Manager in the Hospital's 
Quality Assurance Department. R. at 78-80, attached as Exhibit C to Addendum. 
Plaintiffs served their reply memorandum in support of their First Motion to Compel on 
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December 5,2003. R. at 101-159. The trial court denied plaintiffs First Motion to 
Compel in a March 4, 2004 Minute Entry. R. at 173-75; Exhibit A. Due to a clerical 
error, copies of the Minute Entry were sent to the parties signed but undated. R. at 345. 
To preserve plaintiffs' right to file a timely petition for interlocutory appeal, the trial court 
entered a new Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a Minute Entry dated 
May 21, 2004. R. at 345, attached as Exhibit D to Addendum. The trial court's May 21, 
2004 Minute Entry did not alter the substance of the March 4, 2004 Minute Entry or 
otherwise change the trial court's reasoning for denying plaintiffs' First Motion to 
Compel. R. at 345; Exhibit D. 
On June 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to appeal the trial 
court's interlocutory Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Brief without 
exhibits is attached as Exhibit E to Addendum. The sole issue presented by plaintiffs in 
their petition is whether any existing incident report is discoverable. Exhibit E. On 
June 16, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court for disposition. 
R. at 359. This Court granted plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal in an Order 
dated June 28,2004. R. at 362. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is an action for alleged medical malpractice arising from treatment 
rendered to decedent Gary R. Cannon during his admission at the Hospital from May 16, 
2001 through May 21, 2001. (R. at 3-5.) 
2. On May 18, 2001, Mr. Cannon was found on the floor in his hospital room. 
(R. at 5.) 
3. Plaintiffs' first set of requests for production of documents includes a 
request for any incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall while 
he was a patient at the Hospital. (R. at 13.) 
4. On February 24,2003, the Hospital responded to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The Hospital specifically 
objected to plaintiffs' request for any existing incident report on the grounds of the care-
review privilege, which is codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1 to -5. (R. 42-43.) 
5. On October 24,2003, plaintiffs served their First Motion to Compel 
production of any incident report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's alleged fall 
at the Hospital. (R. at 58-67.) 
6. On November 16, 2003, the Hospital served its memorandum in opposition 
to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Supporting the Hospital's memorandum is the 
affidavit of Linda Wright, who is the Risk Manager in the Hospital's Quality Assurance 
Department. (R. at 68-92; Exhibit C.) 
7. In her affidavit, Linda Wright testifies that the Hospital's Quality Assurance 
Department is charged with the responsibility of collecting and evaluating incident 
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reports for the purpose of assessing, evaluating and improving the quality of health care 
rendered to patients at the Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.) 
8. Ms. Wright further testifies that incident reports are not created or used for 
any purpose other than for evaluating and improving the health care rendered to patients 
at the Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.) 
9. Ms. Wright also testifies that incident reports are not included in the 
patient's medical records and do not constitute routine business or medical records of the 
Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.) 
10. Ms. Wright finally testifies that incident reports are necessary and critical to 
the care-review work performed by the Hospital's Quality Assurance Department. (R. at 
79; Exhibit C.) 
11. On December 5,2003, plaintiffs served a reply memorandum in support of 
their First Motion to Compel and submitted the motion to the trial court for decision. 
Plaintiffs did not request additional time to conduct discovery prior to submitting their 
First Motion to Compel for decision. (R. at 99-159.) 
12. The trial court denied plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a March 4, 2004 
Minute Entry. The trial court relied on Benson v. IHCHosp., Inc., 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 
1993) and the undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright in concluding that any 
existing incident report is privileged and not discoverable. (R. at 173-175; Exhibit A.) 
13. Due to a clerical error, copies of the March 4, 2004 Minute Entry were sent 
to counsel for the parties signed but not dated. To preserve plaintiffs' right to file a 
timely petition for interlocutory appeal, the trial court entered a new Order denying 
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plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a Minute Entry dated May 21, 2004. The trial 
court's May 21, 2004 Minute Entry did not alter the substance of the March 4,2004 
Minute Entry or otherwise change the trial court's reasoning for denying plaintiffs' First 
Motion to Compel. (R. at 345; Exhibit D.) 
14. On June 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to appeal the trial 
court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel (Exhibit E.) 
15. Following the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to 
Compel, plaintiffs sought additional discovery related to any existing incident report. 
Specifically, plaintiffs served interrogatories and requests for admission related to any 
existing incident report. Plaintiffs also sought to depose Linda Wright and other Hospital 
representatives who have knowledge about any existing incident report (the "Rule 
30(b)(6) deponents"). Plaintiffs' notices of deposition are not included in the record on 
appeal. (R. at 203-204,228.) 
16. In a letter dated March 19,2004, counsel for the Hospital informed 
plaintiffs' counsel that the Hospital would not produce Linda Wright or the Rule 30(b)(6) 
deponents for deposition questioning about any existing incident report unless ordered to 
do so by the trial court. Counsel for the Hospital relied on the trial court's March 4,2004 
Minute Entry in refusing to produce the requested deponents. (R. at 228.) 
17. On March 24,2004, plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel ("Second 
Motion to Compel") the depositions of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. 
(R. at 215-230.) 
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18. In a Minute Entry dated May 21,2004, the trial court partially granted 
plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs "are 
entitled to depose Linda Wright." The Minute Entry is silent with respect to plaintiffs' 
request for an order compelling the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. (R. at 
347-48, attached as Exhibit F to Addendum.) 
19. Plaintiffs have not petitioned for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's 
May 21, 2004 Minute Entry regarding the deposition of Linda Wright and the Rule 
30(b)(6) deponents. (Exhibit A.) 
20. In April 2004, the Hospital responded to plaintiffs' interrogatories and 
requests for admission related to any existing incident report. The Hospital objected to 
the interrogatories and requests for admission on the grounds of attorney client privilege; 
attorney work product doctrine; the trial court's March 4,2004 Minute Entry; Utah's 
care-review statute; and the cases cited in the Hospital's memoranda in opposition to 
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (R. at 330-335, 393-94.) 
21. On July 16,2004, the Hospital filed a motion for protective order and stay 
of all discovery relating to any existing incident report pending disposition of the case on 
appeal. The trial court has not yet ruled on the Hospital's motion. (R. at 375-406.) 
22. On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs responded to the Hospital's motion for 
protective order and stay of all discovery pending appeal by filing a third motion to 
compel ("Third Motion to Compel") answers to their interrogatories and requests for 
admission related to any existing incident report. Plaintiffs' Third Motion to Compel also 
seeks an order compelling the deposition of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) 
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deponents. Plaintiffs' Third Motion to Compel is not part of the appellate record in this 
case, and the trial court has not yet ruled on the motion. 
23. On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs also filed a motion with this Court for an 
extension of time to file their appellate brief and for an order compelling additional 
discovery related to any existing incident report. Included in plaintiffs' motion is a 
request for an order compelling (1) answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for 
admission regarding any existing incident report; and (2) the depositions of Linda Wright 
and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. (Pis.' Mot. for Ext. of Time; brief without exhibits 
attached as Exhibit G to Addendum.) 
24. On August 26, 2004, the Hospital filed a memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file their appellate brief and for an order 
compelling additional discovery related to any existing incident report. (Hosp.'s Mem. in 
Opp'n to Mot. for Ext. of Time; brief without exhibits attached as Exhibit H to 
Addendum.) 
25. On September 2, 2004, this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for an extension 
of time to file their appellate brief and for an order compelling additional discovery 
related to any existing incident report. (9/2/04 Order, attached as Exhibit I to 
Addendum.) 
26. The Hospital has disclosed the names of all Hospital employees known to 
have discoverable information regarding the facts of this case, including the facts 
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall. (R. at 35-39, 176-178.) 
27. Plaintiffs have not taken any depositions in this case. 
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28. Counsel for the Hospital has deposed the following individuals: 
Dr. Ronald Ward 3/24/04 Gary Cannon's treating physician 
Dr. Diana Banks 2/27/04 Kathryn Cannon's treating physician 
Kathryn Cannon 10/21/03 Plaintiff 
Lane Cannon 10/21/03 Plaintiff 
Roland Cannon 10/21/03 Plaintiff 
(R. at 48-50,160-162,166-168.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves a straight forward application of Utah's care-review statute. 
The undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that any existing incident 
report is privileged and not discoverable. The undisputed evidence also establishes that 
all statutory and case law requirements for application of the care-review privilege have 
been met. Furthermore, protection of any existing incident report is consistent with the 
Utah State Legislature's intent and with public policy supporting the assessment and 
improvement of health care. 
Additional corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident 
report are not required under Utah law, and the trial court acted within its discretion in 
denying plaintiffs' motion to compel any existing incident report without conducting an 
in-camera review or requiring additional evidence to corroborate the testimony of Linda 
Wright. 
Plaintiffs already have access to the facts of this case, including the facts 
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall, through non-privileged sources of discovery. 
Protection of any existing incident report from discovery will neither preclude plaintiffs 
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from discovering the facts of the case nor abrogate their cause of action against the 
Hospital. 
The sole issue before the Court is whether any existing incident report is 
discoverable. Issues pertaining to additional discovery related to any existing incident 
report are not part of this interlocutory appeal and are not included in the record on 
appeal. Therefore, the Court should refuse to consider arguments pertaining to such 
issues. Rather, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion 
to Compel and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT ANY 
EXISTING INCIDENT REPORT IS PRIVILEGED 
Utah's care-review statute provides that "any person" may provide "interviews," 
"reports," "statements" or "memoranda" to "any health facility's in-house staff committee 
for the uses described in Subsection (3)" of section 26-25-1. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-
1(1), (2) (1998); Exhibit B. Subsection (3) in turn provides that the reports, statements or 
memoranda may be provided for "the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health 
care rendered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers." Utah Code Ann. § 
26-25-1(3); Exhibit B. Finally, the statute provides that "[a]ll information, reports, 
statements, memoranda, or other data" furnished by reason of the statute is "privileged 
communications and [is] not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal 
proceeding of any kind or character." Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1998); Exhibit B. The 
privilege thus extends to all information furnished by reason of the statute and not merely 
all non-factual information, as argued by plaintiffs. Pis.' Br., p. 11. 
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The affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that any existing incident 
report created in this case is privileged under the statute. First, there can be no dispute 
that any existing incident report would in fact be a report, statement or memorandum. R. 
at 79, % 2; Exhibit C. Moreover, Ms. Wright's affidavit establishes that the Hospital's 
Quality Assurance Department is charged with the responsibility of collecting and 
evaluating incident reports for the purpose of assessing and improving the quality of 
health care provided to patients. R. at 79, ^  2; Exhibit C. In addition, incident reports are 
created and submitted to the Quality Assurance Department for the sole purpose of 
evaluating and improving the care provided to patients at the Hospital. R. at 79, ffif 3-5, 7; 
Exhibit C. Finally, Ms. Wright's affidavit establishes that incident reports are critical to 
the care-review function of the Quality Assurance Department. R. at 79, f 9; Exhibit C. 
In the only case interpreting Utah's care-review statute, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the care-review privilege attaches only to materials that are prepared 
specifically to be submitted for care-review purposes. Benson v. I.H.C. Hosp., Inc., 866 
P.2d 537, 540 (1993). The affidavit of Linda Wright also establishes compliance with the 
specifically-prepared requirement of Benson. The Quality Assurance Department 
requires Hospital staff to prepare incident reports for all unusual occurrences. R. at 79, f 
3; Exhibit C. The reports are specifically created for submission to the Quality Assurance 
Department. R. at 79, If 4; Exhibit C. Just as important, the Quality Assurance 
Department reviews each incident report that is created. R. at 79, f 5; Exhibit C. Incident 
reports are required, submitted and reviewed because they are critical to the Quality 
Assurance Department's responsibility for assessing and improving the quality of health 
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care provided to patients at the Hospital. R. at 79, f 6; Exhibit C. Because incident 
reports created by Hospital staff satisfy all statutory and common law requirements, any 
existing incident report created in this case is privileged and not subject to discovery. 
II. ADDITIONAL CORROBORATING EVIDENCE IS NOT 
REQUIRED OR NECESSARY 
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Wright's affidavit is inadequate to establish that the care-
review privilege applies to any existing incident report. Pis.' Br. p. 15. Plaintiffs 
specifically argue that the Hospital was required to submit additional evidence, such as 
the Hospital's bylaws, rules and regulations, to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Wright. 
Id. at p. 16. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court was required to conduct an in-
camera review of any existing incident report. Id. at p. 17. 
Despite plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, Ms. Wright's affidavit testimony 
sufficiently establishes that the care-review privilege applies. The plain language of the 
care-review statute does not require a health care facility to provide additional 
corroborative evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 to -3. In any event, plaintiffs in the 
present case did not file a motion for an in-camera review or for additional corroborative 
evidence prior to submitting their First Motion to Compel for decision. More 
importantly, the trial court did not request or need additional corroborating evidence or an 
in-camera review before ruling that any existing incident report is privileged. 
In Utah, a trial court has discretion to conduct an in-camera review of privileged 
documents but is not required to do so. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 
UT 39, ^  22, 78 P.3d 603 (stating that a trial court may conduct in-camera review "where 
appropriate"); Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, ^  25, 83 
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P.3d 391 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in discovery 
matters by denying the plaintiffs motion for an in-camera review). Massachusetts' 
highest court has recognized that an in-camera review of incident reports "necessarily 
involves an invasion and dilution of a statutory privilege" and that such a review should 
be conducted only as a "last resort" when other evidence, such as affidavit testimony, 
does not establish the privilege. Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1312-1315 (Mass. 
1998) (holding that affidavit testimony alone was sufficient to establish privilege). 
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs' First Motion 
to Compel without conducting an in-camera review of any existing incident report or 
requiring additional corroborative evidence. No motion for an in-camera review or 
additional corroborative evidence was filed by plaintiffs, and other undisputed evidence, 
namely the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright, establishes the privilege. Under these 
circumstances, an in-camera review and/or additional corroborative evidence were not 
warranted. 
Because Utah's courts have addressed the issue and given trial courts discretion 
with respect to in-camera reviews, case law from Texas or any other jurisdiction is not 
persuasive and should be ignored. In any event, plaintiffs' reliance on Texas case law is 
misplaced. First, none of the Texas cases cited by plaintiffs require the production of 
bylaws or other hospital rules in addition to affidavit testimony. Mem 7 Hosp.-The 
Woodlands v. McGown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1996); In re Osteopathic Med. Ctr. of 
Tex., 16 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Tex. App. 2000); Arlington Mem 'IHosp. Found., Inc. v. 
Barton, 952 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App. 1997); Northeast Cmty. Hosp. v. Gregg, 815 
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S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App. 1991). To the contrary, the Texas Court of Appeals has 
stated that a party's duty to establish the existence of a privilege is "generally 
accomplished by affidavit." In re Osteopathic Med. Or. of Tex., 16 S.W.3d at 884. 
With respect to in-camera reviews, Texas has a specific rule of civil procedure that 
permits but does not require such review. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.4; see also In re Ching, 32 
S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that an in-camera review may be conducted if 
the trial court determines that it "is necessary"). Moreover, an in-camera review is 
required in Texas only when the party seeking discovery has introduced evidence which 
counters the evidence tendered by the opposing party to establish the existence of the 
privilege. Osborne v. Johnson, 954 S.W.2d 180, 185 (Tex. App. 1997). 
Here, plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence in opposition to the affidavit of 
Linda Wright. While plaintiffs point to a training video allegedly used by the Hospital, 
that tape was not produced by the Hospital in this case, was not provided to the trial court 
for review, has not been admitted into evidence by the trial court and is not included in 
the record on appeal. Accordingly, the tape does not constitute evidence opposing the 
affidavit of Linda Wright and should be ignored by this Court. State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 
8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 (stating that an appellate court's review is "limited to the evidence 
contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations omitted)). 
Even if the Court accepted plaintiffs' statements regarding the video tape, those 
statements do not address the elements of Utah's care-review statute or in any way 
contradict the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright. Even under Texas law, an in-camera 
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review would not be required because plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence to 
contradict the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions otherwise, Utah law does not require additional 
corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident report. The trial 
court acted within its discretion in relying on the undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda 
Wright to deny plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. 
III. CASE LAW INTERPRETING CARE-REVIEW STATUTES IN 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS IS NOT PERSUASIVE OR HELPFUL 
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that information and material prepared 
specifically for submission for care-review purposes is privileged. Benson, 866 P.2d at 
540. Plaintiffs' reliance on case law interpreting care-review statutes that are materially 
different from Utah's care-review statute is not persuasive or helpful. The North Dakota 
Supreme Court has recognized that while nearly every state has a peer-review and/or a 
care-review privilege statute, "it appears that no two statutes, or courts' interpretations of 
them, are alike." Trinity Med. Ctr.t Inc. v. Holurn, 544 N.W.2d 148, 153 (N.D. 1996). 
Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded "because of the lack of 
uniformity among the various states' peer review privilege statutes, caselaw [sic] 
interpreting those statutes is not highly persuasive in our interpretation of [the North 
Dakota statute]." Id. 
A review of the cases cited by plaintiffs demonstrate that they are not on point. 
For instance, plaintiffs rely heavily on unreported cases from Virginia. Pis.' Br., pp. 6-9. 
The Virginia statute at issue in both Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem 'IHosp., 45 Va. Cir. 
356, (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998), copy attached in R. at 133-137 and as Exhibit J to Addendum, 
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and Benedict v. Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, 10 Va. Cir. 430, 1988 WL 626030, at *4 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1988), copy attached as Exhibit K to Addendum, is materially different from 
the statute at issue in this case. In particular, the Virginia statute expressly excludes from 
the care-review privilege records "'kept in the ordinary course of business of operating a 
hospital [or] any facts or information contained in such records.5" Id. at *4 (quoting Va. 
Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 (1988)). 
The court in Benedict concluded that the ordinary course of a hospital's business is 
to prevent accidents or mishaps. Id. at *5. The court then determined that any document, 
including incident reports, relating to the all-embracing concept of patient welfare and 
safety falls within the exception to Virginia's care-review statute. Id. The court in 
Benedict therefore based its analysis on the specific language of the Virginia statute. 
Benedict served as the "basis" for the court's decision in Bradburn. 45 Va. Cir. Ct. at 
361. Because Utah's care-review statute does not include an exception similar to the one 
included in Virginia's statute, cases interpreting the Virginia statute are not on point. 
Even the court in Benedict acknowledged that the incident report at issue in that case 
would be privileged but for the specific exception included in the Virginia statute. Id. at 
*3. 
Interestingly, Virginia circuit courts have differed in their treatment of incident 
reports. In a decision that is more recent than Benedict, a Virginia Circuit Court held that 
a hospital's incident reports should be protected from disclosure. Mangano v. 
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66, 1993 WL 945920, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993), copy attached as 
Exhibit L to Addendum. The court in Mangano acknowledged a difference of opinion 
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with respect to how broadly the Virginia privilege should be read and applied. Id. at *1. 
The court in Mangano concluded that the privilege should be read broadly in accordance 
with the legislature's desire to promote the exposure and frank discussion of mistakes and 
mishaps. Id. at *2. Thus, even when considered against Virginia's broad exception to the 
care-review privilege, incident reports have still been found to be privileged in that 
jurisdiction. 
In any event, case law interpreting the Virginia statute is not on point. Utah's 
care-review statute does not contain an exception to the privilege for records created in 
the ordinary course of business, and such an exception cannot be read into Utah's statute. 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998) ('"[C]ourts are not to infer substantive 
terms into the text [of a statute] that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation [of 
Utah's care-review statute] must be based on the language used, and the court has no 
power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." (Citation 
omitted.)). Unlike the Virginia statute, Utah's care-review statute does not contain any 
exceptions to the privilege. 
Additional case law cited by plaintiffs is equally unhelpful because the statutes 
applied in those cases are materially different from Utah's care-review statute. See, e.g., 
Cochran v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641, 644 (W.D. Ark. 1995) 
(applying Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-105, which expressly provides that incident reports are 
not privileged); Hill v. Sandhu, 129 F.R.D. 548, 550 (D. Kan. 1990) (applying Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 65-4915, which limits the privilege to records generated by the review 
committee); Porter v. Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 77, 78 (D. Kan. 1987) (applying Kan. Stat. 
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Ann. § 65-2836, which limits the privilege to the records generated by the review 
committee); Natl Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Sen>. of Midwest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 
694, 701 (Ark. 1990) (applying Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-105); Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 936 P.2d 844, 849 (Nev. 1997) (applying 
Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.265, which limits the privilege to the proceedings and records 
generated by the review committee); Romero v. Cohen, 679 N.Y.S.2d 264, 294 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1998) (applying N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527, which allows for discovery of 
statement made by the defendant to a review committee); Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 152-153 (N.D. 1996) (applying North Dakota statute that limits 
the privilege to the records and proceedings of the review committee itself). 
Plaintiffs' analogy to motor vehicle investigative reports is likewise inapplicable. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-40 (Supp. 2004), law enforcement agencies are 
expressly required to disclose investigative reports to a variety of individuals and entities, 
including those involved in a motor vehicle accident. Id. Furthermore, motor vehicle 
investigative reports do not serve the same internal quality assurance and improvement 
purposes of incident reports. For these reasons, plaintiffs' comparison between incident 
reports and motor vehicle investigative reports is not valid. 
The protection afforded by Utah's care-review privilege turns on the plain 
language of section 26-25-3, the legislative intent behind section 26-25-3 and case law 
interpreting section 26-25-3. As argued above, the undisputed evidence establishes that 
any existing incident report is privileged under Utah's care-review statute and case law 
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interpreting that statute. Moreover, as argued below, legislative intent and public policy 
support protection of any existing incident report from discovery. 
To the extent the Court is inclined to look at case law from other jurisdictions, a 
number of jurisdictions have held that incident reports are privileged and not 
discoverable. See, e.g., Romero, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 264,266-67 (recognizing that other 
jurisdictions preclude or limit discovery of peer review records); William D. Bremer, 
J.D., Annotation, Scope and Extent ofProt. From Disclosure of Med. Peer Review 
Proceedings Relating to Claim in Med. Malpractice Action, 69 A.L.R. 5th 559 (1999). 
IV. THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY 
STATED ITS INTENT TO PROTECT INCIDENT REPORTS FROM 
DISCOVERY 
When interpreting statutes, a court's "primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. 
State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Here, the Utah State Legislature's intent with 
respect to quality assurance materials such as incident reports is unequivocal. 
The care-review privilege was strengthened by the Utah State Legislature in 
response to the Utah Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Benson. The statute reviewed in 
Benson provided that reports "'are privileged communications and may not be used or 
received in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or character.'" Benson, 866 
P.2d at 539 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1993)). In Benson, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that the care-review privilege, as drafted by the legislature, protected 
care-review information from use at trial but did not protect such materials from 
discovery requests. Id. at 540. The court noted that if the legislature intended to protect 
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such materials from discovery, it could have expressly done so by using such language in 
the statute. Id. 
In response to the Benson decision, the Utah State Legislature amended the care-
review statute in 1994 to protect incident reports and other care-review materials from 
discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1994). Representative Melvin Brown proposed a 
quality assurance amendment to section 26-25-3 clarifying that care-review materials "are 
not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or 
character." Rep. Brown Amend, to Sub. S.B. 158, attached as Exhibit M to Addendum. 
Immediately below Representative Brown's proposed amendment was the following 
handwritten note: 
It is and has been the intention of the legislature that the 
broadest scope of privilege, including not being subject to 
discovery, has been the intention of the legislature in not 
permitting the materials described above to be used or 
received in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or 
character. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
When introducing his proposed amendment on the floor of the House of 
Representatives, Representative Brown stated that millions of dollars are saved by 
eliminating unnecessary or inappropriate care through quality assurance activities. Utah 
State House of Rep., Floor Deb. on Sub. S.B. 158, Remarks of Rep. Brown, 50th Leg., 
Gen. Sess., Day 45, March 2, 1994, Tape 1, Counter No. 1034. Representative Brown 
further stated that its was in the "public interest for these [quality assurance] activities to 
occur to the maximum extent possible and that they [will not] be if people [are not] 
protected from discovery." Id. (Emphasis added.) Representative Brown concluded by 
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reiterating that it was the legislature's intent that quality assurance activities not be 
subject to discovery. Id. No representative spoke against Representative Brown's 
proposed amendment. Id. The amendment was passed by both houses of the legislature 
and signed into law by the governor. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1994). 
The 1994 amendment to section 26-25-3 is the determinitive law in this case. In 
passing the 1994 amendment, the legislature could not have been more clear in signaling 
its intent that quality assurance materials are not subject to discovery. The Court should 
give effect to the legislature's intent by affirming the trial court's Order denying 
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. 
V. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS PROTECTION OF INCIDENT 
REPORTS 
The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the public policy concerns expressed by 
Representative Brown. In Benson, the court recognized that the purpose of the care-
review statute is to provide information that may be used to evaluate and improve medical 
care provided to patients. 866 P.2d at 539. The court also recognized that in the absence 
of the privilege, "personnel might be reluctant to give such information, and the accuracy 
of the information and the effectiveness of the studies would diminish greatly." Id. 
Protecting incident reports from discovery is necessary to ensure the candid feedback that 
is required to accomplish the purposes of the care-review statute. 
VI. THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH NON-
PRIVILEGED SOURCES 
Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that they do not have access to the facts of 
this case. Pis.' Br., p. 11. Plaintiffs' argument simply does not hold up under scrutiny. 
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First, plaintiffs have all of Mr. Cannon's medical records at their disposal. Second, the 
Hospital has disclosed the identities of all Hospital employees known to have 
discoverable information regarding the facts of this case, including knowledge about 
Mr. Cannon's alleged fall. R. at 35-39, 176-178. Significantly, plaintiffs have failed to 
depose any of these individuals even though nearly two years have passed since the case 
was commenced. 
Plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain about stale evidence and alleged holes in the 
medical records when they have not bothered to depose Hospital employees who have 
discoverable knowledge about the facts of the case. Rather than work up their case 
through permissible avenues of discovery, plaintiffs have instead chosen to spend their 
time and resources in pursuit of what could aptly be described as a crusade to circumvent 
the care-review privilege. Plaintiffs' attempt to cast themselves as somehow 
disadvantaged in the discovery process is not supported by the facts. 
VII. THE ALLEGED TRAINING VIDEO SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF 
THE CARE-REVIEW PRIVILEGE 
As already pointed out, the training video allegedly used by the Hospital was not 
produced in this case, was not provided to the trial court for review, has not been admitted 
into evidence by the trial court and is not part of the record on appeal. For all of these 
reasons, the Court should not consider any arguments pertaining to the video. In any 
event, the video actually supports the privilege that shields any existing incident report 
from discovery. As alleged by plaintiffs, the video instructs that all circumstances and 
findings regarding a patient's fall should be documented in both the patient's medical 
chart and an incident report. Pis.' Br., p. 19. 
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A patient's medical records are discoverable and have been provided to plaintiffs 
in this case.2 Thus, the facts surrounding a patient's fall are not hidden and suppressed 
but rather disclosed in the patient's medical records. Likewise, the facts contained in 
Mr. Cannon's medical records can be supplemented and further understood through 
depositions of those individuals who were involved in providing care to Mr. Cannon. 
Because the basic facts surrounding a patient's fall are obtainable through non-privileged 
sources, incident reports should be fully protected, as intended by the Utah State 
Legislature. 
Incident reports are not part of a patient's medical records and are created for the 
limited purpose of allowing a hospital to assess and improve the health care provided to 
patients. R. at 79, fflf 7-8; Exhibit C. Plaintiffs' attempt to read an exception into the 
care-review statute for factual materials that may be contained in an incident report is not 
supported by the plain language of the statute, not supported by the legislative intent and 
public policy behind the statute and not necessary given the availability of factual 
information from non-privileged sources. 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS NOT ABROGATED BY 
THE CARE-REVIEW PRIVILEGE 
Plaintiffs cite case law from other jurisdictions in support of their argument that 
competing interests in this case should be resolved in favor of disclosure. Pis.' Br., pp. 
2Mr. Cannon's medical records are not part of the record on appeal. While the 
Hospital disputes plaintiffs' accusations regarding the completeness of Mr. Cannon's 
medical records, the Court should ignore any arguments pertaining to the substance of 
those records. Pliego, 1999 UT 8 at f7 (stating that an appellate court's review is 
"limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations 
omitted)). 
-23-
11-15. The cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point. The plaintiff in Greenwood v. 
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), asserted a claim against the hospital alleging that 
it failed to properly investigate, certify or review a physician's surgical skills and the 
procedure he performed on the plaintiff. Id. at 1081. 
The issue in Greenwood was whether the plaintiff was entitled to hospital records 
concerning the physician's privileges and credentialing. Id. at 1082. The court in 
Greenwood held that denying the plaintiff access to those records by virtue of the peer-
review privilege would be tantamount to denying a cause of action against hospitals for 
negligence in credentialing physicians and maintaining qualified medical personnel. Id. 
at 1087. The court refused to construe the statute at issue in Greenwood so broadly when 
the legislature had not expressly done so in the language of the statute. Id. at 1088. 
Likewise, Adams v. St. Francis Reg'IMed. Ctr., 955 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1998), involved a 
situation in which the plaintiffs had no other way to develop the facts of the case without 
access to the documents at issue. Id. at 1180. 
As pointed out previously, plaintiffs in the present case have access to the facts 
involving the care provided to Mr. Cannon, including the facts surrounding his alleged 
fall, through non-privileged sources. Plaintiffs' failure to mine discoverable sources of 
information about the case is no one's fault but their own, This case has been pending for 
nearly two years. During that time, plaintiffs have chosen not to take any depositions to 
supplement the evidence contained in the medical records concerning Mr. Cannon's 
alleged fall or the treatment and care provided to Mr. Cannon in general. Because neither 
plaintiffs' malpractice claim nor access to the facts surrounding that claim have been 
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abrogated by the care-review privilege, the concerns addressed in Greenwood and Adams 
do not apply. 
Likewise, case law cited by plaintiffs that addresses the scope of the presidential 
privilege is not applicable. Pis.' Br., pp. 13-15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 
S. Ct. 3090 (1974) is distinguishable from the present case. First, Nixon addressed the 
scope of a privilege in the context of a criminal prosecution and not a civil case involving 
claims of negligence. Id. at 683, 94 S. Ct. at 3095. In a criminal case, constitutional 
considerations arise that do not apply in a civil case. See, e.g., State v. One 1980 
Cadillac, 2001 UT 26,1f 14, 21 P.3d 212 (stating that Sixth Amendment right to confront 
accusers and to have assistance of counsel applies in criminal prosecutions but not in civil 
in rem proceedings). In Nixon, the Supreme Court cited concerns about the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses in a criminal case and carefully noted that its 
decision was limited to balancing the competing interests in a criminal matter. Id. at 712 
n. 19,94 S.Ct. at 3109. 
Second, Nixon involved interpretation of a privilege, the presidential privilege, that 
is implied from the President's Article II powers but not expressly set forth or limited in 
the text of Constitution. Id. at 711, 94 S. Ct. at 3109. In contrast, this case involves the 
scope of an express statutory privilege in a civil matter. Case law from the Supreme 
Court addressing the scope of a different and implied privilege in the context of a 
criminal prosecution is not relevant to the issue before the Court. 
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IX. THE HOSPITAL'S COMPLIANCE WITH A COURT ORDER IN 
ANOTHER CASE IS NOT BINDING IN THIS CASE AND DOES 
NOT BAR THE HOSPITAL FROM ASSERTING THE CARE-
REVIEW PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE 
Plaintiffs seem to imply that the Hospital's compliance with an order to compel an 
incident report in another case forever precludes the Hospital from opposing a request for 
an incident report in the future. The trial court's decision compelling production of an 
incident report in the Adam case does constitute binding precedent on either the trial court 
or this Court. 
Utah law allows for a second trial court judge to revisit an issue ruled upon by 
another judge when the issue is presented in a different factual or legal light or when the 
second judge determines that the first judge's ruling was erroneous. Red Flame, Inc. v. 
Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ffl[ 4-5, 996 P.2d 540. A second look at the issue of whether any 
existing incident report is discoverable was warranted by the trial court in this case 
because additional factual material was presented, namely the affidavit of Linda Wright, 
that was not presented for review to the court in the Adam case. The trial court's ruling in 
the Adam case was based on the absence of an affidavit or other evidence establishing 
that incident reports are created specifically for submission for review purposes. R. at 
127-29; attached as Exhibit N to Addendum. 
When the same issue arose in the present case, the Hospital, who is represented by 
a different lead attorney, submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in support of its 
opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. R. at 78-80; Exhibit C. The affidavit 
testimony of Linda Wright establishes that incident reports are in fact prepared 
specifically for care-review and quality assurance purposes. R. at 79, fflf 4, 7; Exhibit C. 
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The Hospital has consistently opposed requests for production of incident reports. Just 
because the Hospital complied with an order compelling production of an incident report 
in the Adam case does not mean that the Hospital picks and chooses when to "hide 
behind" the care-review privilege. Pis.' Br., p. 21. 
The Hospital has consistently and correctly relied on the care-review statute for 
protection of incident reports from discovery, regardless of whether the information 
contained in them is favorable. Because the plain language of the care-review statute, 
case law interpreting that statute, legislative history and public policy all support the 
protection of incident reports from discovery, the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs' 
First Motion to Compel should be affirmed. 
X. PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON THOSE MOTIONS ARE NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
This Court granted plaintiffs' petition for permission to appeal the trial court's 
order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. The sole issue presented by plaintiffs' 
petition is whether any existing incident report is discoverable. Exhibit E. Subsequent to 
the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs filed two additional 
motions to compel discovery related to any existing incident report, and the Hospital filed 
a motion to stay all discovery related to any existing incident report pending resolution of 
this appeal. R. at 215-30, 375-406. The trial court has ruled on one of those three 
motions. R. at 347-48; Exhibit F. The two remaining motions are fully briefed, 
submitted and under review by the trial court. 
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None of the three motions filed subsequent to the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' 
First Motion to Compel are properly before the Court because (1) the Court granted 
plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal for the limited purpose of reviewing the trial 
court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel; and (2) the trial court has not yet 
ruled on two of the three motions pertaining to additional discovery related to any 
existing incident report. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, % 9, 992 P.2d 986 (limiting the 
court's review to issues presented in the petition for interlocutory appeal); Brumley v. 
Utah State Tax Comm % 868 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1993) (affirming that Utah's appellate 
courts serve a "limited function" of reviewing "orders and judgments made by the trial 
court in the first instance"). 
Furthermore, only a small portion of the briefing completed on the two pending 
motions is included in the record on appeal. The Court should decline plaintiffs' 
invitation to address issues and motions that are not included in the record on appeal. 
Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7 (stating that an appellate court's review is "limited to the 
evidence contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations omitted)). Finally, 
this Court has previously denied plaintiffs' motion for an order compelling additional 
discovery pertaining to any existing incident report. Exhibit I. There is no need for the 
Court to revisit the issue. For all of these reasons, the Court should not consider 
plaintiffs' arguments or requests for relief pertaining to additional discovery related to 
any existing incident report. 
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CONCLUSION 
The undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that the care-
review privilege applies to any existing incident report and that all statutory and case law 
requirements pertaining to the care-review privilege have been satisfied. No additional 
corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident report is required 
under the law, and such additional measures were not requested by the trial court. The 
trial court acted well within its discretion in denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel on 
the basis of the undisputed testimony of Linda Wright. 
Both legislative intent and public policy support and require protection of incident 
reports from discovery. Plaintiffs have access to the facts of the case, including those 
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall, through non-privileged sources of discovery. The 
protection of any existing incident report from discovery will not prejudice plaintiffs' 
efforts to discover the facts of the case or abrogate their cause of action for negligence 
against the Hospital. Because issues pertaining to additional discovery related to any 
existing incident report are not properly before the Court, arguments pertaining to 
additional discovery related to any existing incident report should not be considered. 
For these reasons, the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to 
Compel should be affirmed, and the case should be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
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MAR - 4 2004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT D^^^St 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERYN CANNON# as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, LANE CANNON and 
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving 
children and legal heirs of 
GARY R. CANNON, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 020914614 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Compel, dated October 24, 2003. This Court has reviewed arguments 
of counsel and hereby denies plaintiffs1 Motion. 
Pursuant to Benson, ex rel. Benson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. , 866 
P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court equates the peer review 
privilege with the care review privilege. Accordingly, reports are 
privileged if they are "prepared specifically to be submitted for 
review purposes." Id. The only evidence presented in this case is 
the Affidavit of Linda Wright. Ms. Wright asserts that the 
"Incident reports are created specifically for submission to the 
[care review department]," and that "Incident reports are not 
CANNON V. SALT LAKE 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating and 
improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center.... Incident reports are not included as 
part of the patientfs medical records." 
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court 
finds that the reports are privileged. 
CANNON V. SALT LAKE 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of March, 
2004: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David W. Slagle 
Elizabeth L. Willey 
Bradley R. Blackham 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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26-23a-3 HEALTH CODE 
state, shall immediately report to a law enforcement agency 
regarding the injury. 
(b) The report shall state the name and address of the inj 
if known, the person's whereabouts, the character and extent? 
person's injuries, and the name, address, and telephone m 
person making the report. 
(2) A health care provider may not be discharged, suspended, disci] 
harassed for making a report pursuant to this section. 
(3) A person may not incur any civil or criminal liability as a 
making any report required by this section. 
(4) A health care provider who has personal knowledge that the 
wound or injury has been made in compliance with this section is 
further obligation to make a report regarding that wound or injury 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-23a-2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 29,1996, 
1988, oh. 238, 8 2; 1996, ch. 23, 9 2. section (1) and rewrote Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Subsection (4); and made stylistic 
26-23a-3. Penalties. 
Any health care provider who intentionally or knowingly 
provision of Section 26-23a-2 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 26-23a-3, enacted by L. Cross-Referenees. — Sentencing 
1988, eh. 238, fi 3. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-30|. 
CHAPTER 24 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT ACT 
[RENUMBERED] 
26-24-1 to 26-24-24. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1990, ch. 186, 
§§ 889 to 913 renumbered this chapter as 
§§ 17A-3-501 to 17A-3-526, effective April 23, 
1990. Sections 17A-3-501 to 17A-3-624 
renumbered again as §5 26A-1-101 et 
1991. 
CHAPTER 25 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
RELEASE 
Section 
26-25-1. 
26-25-2. 
26-25-3. 
Authority to provide data on treat-
ment and condition of persons 
to designated agencies — Im-
munity from liability. 
Restrictions on use of data. 
Information considered privileged 
communications. 
Section 
26-25-4. 
26-25-5. 
26-25-6. 
Information held in coi 
Protection of identities. ,;; 
Violation of chapter a 
meanor — Civil liability, y 
Repealed. 
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^0*25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and con-
dition of persons to designated agencies — Im-
munity from liability. 
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring 
bjlity, provide the following information to the persons and entities de-
1 in Subsection (2): 
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records 
appointed under Title 26, Chapter 2; 
(b) interviews; 
(c) reports; 
(d) statements; 
(e) memoranda; and 
(f) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to: 
(a) the department and local health departments; 
(b) the Division of Mental Health within the Department of Human 
Services; 
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with 
institutions of higher education; 
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies; 
(e) peer review committees; 
(f) professional review organizations; 
(g) professional societies and associations; and 
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described 
m Subsection (3). 
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the 
following purposes: 
(a) study, with the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality; or 
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care ren-
dered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers. 
f4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, inter-
views, reports, statements, memoranda, or other information relating to the 
ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer review committees, 
professional societies and associations, or any in-hospital staff committee to be 
$sed for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline. 
{$) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of: 
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section; 
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred 
to in this section to advance health research and health education; or 
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance 
with this chapter. 
BJ As used in this chapter: 
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set forth in Section 78-14-3; 
«nd 
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2. 
Pffiatory: C. 1958, 26-85-1, enacted by L. Repeals and Beenactiftenta. — Laws 
pttVch. 126, i 24; 1868, eh. 180, S 1; 1989, 1981, ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-25-1 
ca. 142, $ 1; 1990, ch. 93, * 15; 1990, ch. 114, to 26-25-5 (L. 1967, ch. 48, §§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch. 
I H ; 1990, eh. 188, fi 10; 1992, ch. 240, S 2; 197,55 76 to 79), the Radiation Protection Act. 
W W u 201, fi 18. Present $$ 26-25-1 to 26-25-6 were enacted by 
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§ 24 of the act For present provisions regulat-
ing radiation sources, see § 19-3-301 et seq 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection 
(l)(a) deleted former language pertaining to 
health information required for birth certifi-
cates, m Subsection (2Xa) added "and local 
health departments", and in Subsection (2Xd) 
substituted "Utah Medical Association" for 
"Utah State Medical Association " 
Cross-References. — Attorney of j 
access to medical records, § 78-25-25. 
Child abuse reporting requirements, § { 
4a-401 et seq 
Medical examiner's records, § 26-4-17. 
Physician-patient privilege, § 78-24-8. 
State hospital mental health records, < 
dentiahty, § 62A-12-247. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Limitation on privilege. health care, and only documents prepared « 
The purpose of statutes providing the "care cifically for review purposes are privileged,
 { 
review* privilege is to improve medical care by 
allowing health-care personnel to provide infor-
mation to evaluate and improve hospital and 
documents that might or could be used m j 
review process Benson ex rel Benson v. ] 
Hosps, 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments AJL.R. — Patient's right to disclosure of 
m Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — or her own medical or hospital records,* 
Health Law, 1990 Utah L Rev. 261. A.L R4th 701 
26-25-2. Restrictions on use of data. 
The Division ot Mental Health within the Department ot Human Sei 
scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institul 
higher education, the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied 
societies, peer review committees, professional review organizations, 
sional societies and associations, or any health faculty's in-house staff 
tee may only use or publish the material received or gathered under 
26-25-1 for the purpose of advancing medical research or medical education 
the interest of reducing morbidity or mortality, except that a summary 
studies conducted in accordance with Section 26-25-1 may be released by 
groups for general publication. 
History: C. 1953, 26-25-2, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, 8 24; 1888, ch. ISO, S 2; 1990, 
ch. 188, 4 11; 1996, ch. 201, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, sul 
"Utah Medical Association" for "Utah 
Medical Association" and made 
change 
26-25-3. Information considered privileged commiiniraH 
tions. 
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other dati| 
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resultbifl 
from those studies are privileged communications and are not subject tjj 
discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind fll 
character. 
History: C. 1953, 26-25-3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, i 24; 1989, ch. 142, » 2; 1994, 
ch. 314, ft 3; 1996, ch. 201, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "are 
not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in I 
dence" for "may not be used or receivi " 
evidence" near the end of the section. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 1 
1996, deleted language pertaining to I 
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information required on birth certificates as 
determined by the state registrar of vital 
records 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Limitation on privilege 
Waiver of privilege 
limitation on privilege. 
The purpose of statutes providing the "care 
review" privilege is to improve medical care by 
allowing health-care personnel to provide infor-
mation to evaluate and improve hospital and 
health care, and only documents prepared spe-
cifically for review purposes are privileged, not 
documents that might or could be used in the 
review process Benson ex rel Benson v. I.H.C 
Hosps , 866 P 2d 537 (Utah 1993). 
Waiver of privilege. 
Hospital's inclusion in same documents of 
both privileged and nonpnvxleged materials did 
not waive the privilege as to all of them Benson 
ex rel Benson v. I.H.C. Hosps., 866 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1993) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Discovery of hospital's internal 
records or communications as to qualifications 
or evaluations of individual physician, 81 
A.L R 3d 944. 
26-25-4. Information held in confidence — Protection of 
identities. 
(1) All mlormataon, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other 
data provided to a person or organization under this chapter shall be held in 
strict confidence by that person or organization, and any use, release, or 
publication resulting therefrom shall be made so as to preclude identification 
of any individual or individuals studied. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the department's disclosure of informa-
tion under this chapter is governed by Chapter 3 of this title. 
History: C. 1953, 96-35-4, enacted by L. 
1981, eh. 126, § 24; 1989, ch. 142, 5 3; 1996, 
eh. 201, § 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsec-
tion (2); added the Subsection (1) designation, 
in Subsection (1) deleted former language per-
taining to health information required for birth 
certificates as determined by the state registrar 
of vital records, and made stylistic and related 
changes. 
26-25-5. Violation of chapter a misdemeanor — Civil li-
ability. 
(1) Any use, release or publication, negligent or otherwise, contrary to the 
provisions of this chapter shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not relieve the person or organization responsible for 
such use, release, or publication from civil liability. 
History: C. 1958, 26-25-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, S 24; 1991, ch. 241, ft 19. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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26-25-6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1996, ch. 201, fi 21 repeals 
§ 26-25-6, aa enacted by Laws 1989, ch 25, § 2, 
concerning confidentiality requirements re-
garding communicable or reportable 
effective April 29,1996. 
CHAPTER 25a 
CONFIDENTIAL COIVIMUNICABLE 
DISEASE INFORMATION 
[RENUMBERED] 
26-25a-101 to 26-25a-104. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1996, ch. 201, §§ 9 to 
12 renumbered §§ 26-25a-101 to 26-25a-104, 
relating to confidential communicable disease 
information, as §5 26-6-27 to 26-6-30, efl 
April 29, 1996. 
CHAPTER 26 
EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS 
Section 
26-26-1 
26-26-2 
26-26-3 
"Institution" denned. 
Authorization for institutions to 
obtain impounded animals. 
Period of impoundment and effort 
to find owner prerequisite to de-
livery of animals to institution 
by governing body of county or 
municipality — Owner's pre-
rogative regarding provision of 
Section 
26-26-4. 
26-26-5. 
26-26-7. 
animal to an inj 
Institution to pay trans] 
expense — Restrictions 
of animals — Fee. 
Records of animals required* 
Revocation of authorization*. 
Adoption of rules by dej 
— Inspection and inv< 
of institutions. 
26-26-1. "Institution" defined. 
As used in this chapter, "institution" means any school or college i$ 
agriculture, veterinary medicine, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry or otbm 
educational, hospital or scientific establishment properly concerned with tnfj 
investigation of or instruction concerning the structure or functions of livings 
organisms, the cause, prevention, control or cure of diseases or abnormal 
condition of human beings or animals. 
History: C. 1953, 26-26-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, ft 25. 
Repeals and Reettactments. — Laws 
1981, ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-26-1 
to 26-26-8 (h 1969, ch 64, §§ 1 to 3), the 
Anatomical Gift Act. Present §§ 26-26-1 to 26-
26-7 were enacted by § 25 of the act. For the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, Bee Chapter S&efi 
this title. 
Cross-References. — City pounds, § K M 
64. 
Cruelty to animals as misdemeanor, 8 
301. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
journal ot Energy Law and Policy. — Cages and Codes: The Debate Over the Use of 
IMJB Found Seizure Controversy. A Suggested Laboratory Animals, 11 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 
nempronuse in the Use of Impounded Animals 319 (1991). 
cTfkeearch and Education, U J. Energy L. & Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals 6 43. 
pjl«y 241 (1991). CJJ3. — 3A C J.S. Animals § 342. 
g$-26-2. Authorization for institutions to obtain im-
pounded animals. 
Institutions may apply to the department for authorization to obtain 
gnjipnlB from establishments maintained for the impounding, care and dis-
posal of flpir"»i« seized by lawful authority. If, after investigation, the 
department finds that the institution meets the requirements of this chapter 
and its rules and that the public interest will be served thereby, it may 
authorize the institution to obtain animals under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 26-26-2, enacted by L. 
1961, ch. 126, 5 25. 
26-26-3. Period of impoundment and effort to find owner 
prerequisite to delivery of animals to institution 
by governing body of county or municipality — 
Owner's prerogative regarding provision of ani-
mal to an institution. 
The governing body of the county or municipality in which an establishment 
is located shall make available to an authorized institution as many im-
pounded animals in that establishment as the institution may request; 
provided, however, that such animals shall have been legally impounded at 
least five days or for such other minimum period as may be specified by 
municipal ordinance, and remain unclaimed and unredeemed by their owners 
or by any other person entitled to do so. The establishment shall first make a 
reasonable effort to find the rightful owner of such animal, and if the owner is 
not found, shall make a reasonable effort to make the animal available to 
others during the impound period. Owners of animals who voluntarily provide 
their animals to an establishment may, by signature, determine whether or not 
the animal may be provided to an institution or used for research or 
educational purposes. 
History: C. 1958, 26-26-3, enacted by L. 
1961, ch. 126, 5 25; 1969, ch. 80, 5 1. 
26-26-4. Institution to pay transportation expense — Re-
strictions on use of animals — Fee. 
The authorized institution shall provide, at its own expense, for the 
transportation of such animals from the establishment to the institution and 
shall use them only in the conduct of scientific and educational activities and 
for no other purpose. The institution shall reimburse the establishment for 
animals received. The fee shall be, at a minimum, $15 for cats and $20 for dogs. 
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Exhibit C 
DAVID W. SLAGLE - A2975 
ELIZABETH L. WHXEY - A5639 
BRADLEY R. BLACKHAM A8703 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving spouse 
of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, LANE AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT 
CANNON and ROLAND CANNON, as 
surviving children and legal heirs of GARY R. Civil No. 020914614 
CANNON, deceased, 
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 
THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Linda Wright being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Risk Manager in the Quality Assurance Department at Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center, and I am personally familiar with the facts and matters herein set forth. 
2. The Quality Assurance Department is charged by the Medical Executive 
Committee at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center with responsibility for collecting and 
evaluating unusual occurrence reports (also known as incident reports) for the purpose of 
assessing, evaluating and improving the quality of health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center. 
3. The Quality Assurance Department requires staff at Salt Lake Regional Medical 
Center to fill out incident reports for all unusual occurrences. 
4. Incident reports are created specifically for submission to the Quality Assurance 
Department at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center. 
5. The Quality Assurance Department reviews all incident reports created for the 
specific purpose of evaluating and improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center. 
6. Incident reports are necessary and critical to the care-review work performed by 
the Quality Assurance Department. 
7. Incident reports are not created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating 
and improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center. 
8. Incident reports are not included as part of a patient's medical records. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT PAGE 2 
9. Incident reports do not constitute routine business or medical records of Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center. 
DATED this / 7 day of lyfitflrflhtr, 2003. 
-Jbilicia Wright 
?/&*&-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J2_ day of N/)/&nb*r , 2003. 
a 
R^idin^lc ^122 hL Mmr, / $ALP 
My Commission Expires: 
7/5/05 
O \20440\51\PLEADING\Afiidavit Linda Wnghtwpd 
West Jordan Utah W%$ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
GINA L. MILLER 
4722 WHELENIC LANE 
WC<5T JORDAN, UT8408S 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
FEBRUARY 5, 2005 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT PAGE 3 
Exhibit D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, LANE CANNON and 
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving 
children and legal heirs of 
GARY R. CANNON, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 020914614 
The Court is in receipt today of a letter from plaintiffs1 
counsel, dated March 18, 2004. Due to court error, the copies of 
the Minute Entry denying plaintiffs1 Motion to Compel signed and 
entered March 4, 2 004, were sent to counsel, undated. To preserve 
plaintiffs1 right to file an interlocutory appeal, the Court now 
enters the Order denying plaintiffs1 Motion to Compel on May 21, 
2004. Plaintiffs1 counsel need not prepare a final Order. 
Dated this l\ day of May, 2004. ./^**7'\ 
CANNON V. SALT LAKE 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this Z y ^ d a y of May, 
2004: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David W. Slagle 
Elizabeth L. Willey 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
-1*4 &l*^ 
Exhibit E 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, LANE CANNON and 
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children 
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
(Subject to Assignment 
to the Court of Appeals) 
Case No. 
Third Judicial District Court 
Civil No.: 020914614 
Judge: Judith Atherton 
Pursuant to Rule 5, U.R.A.P., Plaintiffs/Petitioners Katheryn, Lane and Roland 
Cannon hereby petition the Utah Supreme Court to permit an interlocutroy appeal from 
the order of the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton entered on May 21, 2004. The district 
court's Minute Entry was signed on May 21,2004. A copy of that Minute Entry is 
attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A". That minute entry finalized a minute entry which had 
been mailed to plaintiffs' counsel, unsigned and undated in early March, 2004. A copy 
of the unsigned, undated March Minute Entry is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "B". 
I. 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. During the early morning of May 18, 2001, patient Gary Cannon sustained 
a subdural hematoma from a fall in his hospital room on Unit 4C of Salt Lake Regional 
Hospital. Three days later, he died from this injury. On the day the incident occurred, 
incident reports were prepared by members of the nursing staff. 
2. On December 17,2002, plaintiffs submitted in formal discovery a request 
for "each 'incident report' and other documentation of Mr. Cannon's fall during the early 
morning hours of May 18, 2001." 
3. On February 24, 2003, the Hospital formally refused to honor this request, 
claiming the information sought to be protected by care review privilege found in UCA 
§26-25-3. 
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4. On October 24, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of the 
incident reports. On November 17, 2003, the Hospital filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion and on December 5,2003, the plaintiffs filed a reply 
memorandum supporting their motion. After holding the matter under advisement for 
several months, the district court issued its ruling denying plaintiffs' motion to compel 
production of the incident reports. 
5. The district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion was based entirely on a 
conclusory assertion in an affidavit of the hospital's risk manager that the incident 
reports were "not created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating or improving 
. . . health care." The district court stated: "in the absence to any evidence to the 
contrary, this Court finds that the reports are privileged." 
6. Immediately following the district court's denial of their motion, plaintiffs 
undertook additional discovery to test the accuracy of the assertion of the hospital's risk 
manager. They attempted to depose the risk manager and to depose all persons with 
knowledge or information as to the identity of persons who have seen the incident 
reports. (See Exhibits "C" and "D", attached). Plaintiffs also served two requests for 
admissions and two interrogatories seeking admission that the attorneys defending the 
hospital in this action have seen the incident reports. The hospital has refused to 
cooperate in any of these discovery efforts. (See Exhibits "E" and "F", attached). A 
-3-
motion to compel is pending1. 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The issue sought to be reviewed is whether a hospital's factual incident reports, 
created contemporaneously with an event causing injury to a patient, are discoverable. 
Evidence that this issue was preserved in the district court may be found in the district 
court's May 21,2004 Minute Entry (Exhibit "A", attached) in which the district court 
states: 
To preserve plaintiffs' right to file an interlocutory appeal, the 
Court now enters the Order denying plaintiffs' motion to 
compel on May 21, 2004. Plaintiffs' counsel need not 
prepare a final Order. 
1This second motion to compel was submitted for decision on April 2, 2004. 
UCA §78-7-25(1) provides: 
A judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for 
final determination within two months of submission, unless 
circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's 
personal control. 
Despite this statute, no decision has yet been issued. The briefs pertaining to this 
pending motion to compel discovery are attached hereto as Exhibits "G, H, I, J." 
-4-
III. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court's decision that the incident reports are privileged was a 
conclusion of law (based on the district court's interpretation of UCA §26-25-3) which 
must be reviewed for correctness, without according any deference to the district court's 
ruling. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor EX 
REL CT v. Johnson. 977 P.2d 479,480 (Utah 1999); and Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 
777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
IV. 
WHY AN IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED. 
The incident reports plaintiffs seek were written by persons with first-hand 
knowledge and clear recollection of the event on the very day it occurred. They are 
factual in nature. They contemporaneously record important information concerning 
when the patient fell, when and by whom he was discovered and what observations 
were made concerning his position, location and condition after his fall. They also may 
include accurate reporting of when various care providers arrived on the scene to begin 
assisting in the patient's care. 
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Due to prelitigation requirements governing health care malpractice claims in 
Utah, plaintiffs are denied opportunity to obtain statements from key hospital employees 
until long after an event has occurred. By the time a plaintiff discovers which hospital 
employees have knowledge or information of what happened, memories have grown 
dim or become non existent. 
In this case, only the hospital and its representatives have possession of the key 
facts concerning the injury which caused the death of patient Gary Cannon. Over three 
years have elapsed since the patient's death. It is likely that when care providers on 
duty at the time of Mr. Cannon's fall are identified and deposed, they will claim they no 
longer have recollections of what occurred. The only accurate indications of what 
occurred are contained in the incident reports. Although the patient's hospital chart has 
been produced, its entries relating to the patient's fall are terse, unclear and, in some 
respects, inconsistent. 
Plaintiffs' counsel is aware of no Utah authority declaring factual incident reports 
either non discoverable or privileged. Courts in other jurisdictions have found such 
incident reports to be fully discoverable and not privileged. In a medical negligence 
suit, all parties should have access to the same factual information. Factual information 
contained in basic incident reports should not be declared protected by Utah's care-
review privilege statute. Hospitals should not be allowed to hide basic factual 
information behind the cloak of a peer-review statute. 
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There is an additional, unusual reason why production of the incident reports in 
this case should be compelled. Just one day before Mr. Cannon's mishap, another 
patient at this same hospital sustained injuries from an unattended fall. That patient's 
injuries also proved fatal. In the suit brought by his family, a motion to compel 
production of the incident reports was granted. (See Third Judicial District Court Case 
No. 020910871, Adam v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center). The hospital produced 
the reports pertaining to the fall of that patient, as ordered. The fact that the hospital 
produced incident reports in that case renders suspect its risk manager's bald assertion 
that the incident reports in this case were created and used solely for the purposes set 
forth in Utah's care review statute. Denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel in this case 
renders the hospital free to pick and choose when it wishes to hide behind the privilege. 
It will produce incident reports it deems favorable in one case and keep them 
suppressed in another case when the facts they reveal harm its case or rebut its 
defenses. The unfairness produced by inconsistent application of the privilege is 
palpable. 
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V. 
WHY THE APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION. 
Trial of this action without a revelation of the facts contained in the incident 
reports will be essentially meaningless. Plaintiffs will be unable to ascertain the extent 
to which the hospital breached the applicable standard of care without discovery of 
information contained in the incident reports. Proceeding to trial will be a colossal 
waste of judicial and litigant resources. On the other hand, production of the incident 
reports at this juncture could lead to a prompt settlement or, alternatively, could 
conceivably persuade the plaintiffs and their experts that no deviation from the standard 
of care occurred and the suit should therefore be dismissed voluntarily. The incident 
reports hold the key to a just outcome of this case. Determining whether those incident 
reports are discoverable now will save all of the parties and the district court 
considerable time and resources. 
VI. 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THIS CASE. 
The current version of UCA §26-25-3 owes its existence to the Utah legislature's 
modification of the care-review statute following this Court's decision in Benson v. IHC 
Hospitals. Inc. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). In that case, this Court declared that "only 
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material and information prepared specifically for submission to a peer-review 
committee" are subject to privilege. (866 P.2d at 540). In Benson, this Court also dealt 
with another legitimate concern: that documents which should be a part of a patient's 
medical record are labeled as privileged documents and removed from the medical 
record. Id. It has been established through discovery in the Adam v. Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center case that nurses working at this hospital are shown a training 
video entitled "Patient Falls: Panic or Prevention?." That video specifically states, with 
respect to patient falls: 
All circumstances and findings should be documented 
in the patient's chart and on the incident report form. 
It is precisely because the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Cannon's fall are 
not documented in the patient's chart that plaintiffs seek production of the incident 
reports. 
Traditionally, this Court has reserved to itself the task of interpreting statutes 
enacted in response to prior decisions of this Court. This is such an occasion. This 
Court should retain jurisdiction and decide the appeal. 
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VII. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioners ask this Court to do four things: 
1. Permit their interlocutory appeal from the district court's decision denying 
discovery of the hospital's incident reports concerning the decedent's unattended fall; 
2. Retain jurisdiction of this appeal rather than assign it to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition; 
3. Either itself decide the pending motion to compel discovery of the facts 
concerning who has seen and "used" the incident reports the hospital refuses to 
produce to plaintiffs or order the district court to rule on the motion without further delay; 
4. Allow plaintiffs a limited period of time to conduct the discovery they seek 
to conduct for the purpose of presenting sufficient factual information to enable this 
Court to determine whether the incident reports truly were prepared solely for care-
review purposes as alleged by the hospital's risk manager and whether, even if they 
were, they should be shown to plaintiffs' counsel. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June, 2004. 
4, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /d day of June, 2004,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated: 
Elizabeth L. Willey 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
/ U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
• Hand-Delivered 
D Federal Express 
/6>wv<— f)jl LlhxJiJVWbV*-' 
Pldg req for permission to appeal. 0608 
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Exhibit F 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERYN CANNON# as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, LANE CANNON and 
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving 
children and legal heirs of 
GARY R. CANNON, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 020914614 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Discovery and for Sanctions. This Court has reviewed the 
Motion and Memoranda of the parties. The Court agrees with 
plaintiffs1 position concerning this Court's prior ruling. 
Plaintiff is entitled to depose Linda Wright. 
Therefore, plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is granted. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is denied. 
Dated this _day of May, 2004. 
Ifork 
tTHERTON 
JUDGE 
CANNON V. SALT LAKE 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this 2^Y^day 
of May, 2004: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David W. Slagle 
Elizabeth L. Willey 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
'ffltf&a*! 
Exhibit G 
Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, LANE CANNON and 
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children 
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs\Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
I 
MOTION 
Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellants Katheryn, Gary and Lane Cannon hereby move this Court for an order 
IT* b:&lofai 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME WITHIN WHICH 
TO FILE APPEAL BRIEF 
AND 
TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL 
DISCOVERY 
AND 
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 2:0040486-CA 
Third Judicial District Court 
Case No.: 020914614 
Judge Judith S. Atherton 
allowing them to conclude discovery pertaining to the issue raised on appeal, 
requiring the respondent to cooperate in such discovery and directing the district 
court to compel and oversee compliance with such discovery. Appellants also 
move this Court for an order extending the deadline for them to file their appeal 
brief to a date thirty days from the completion of the discovery. 
These motions are supported by the following memorandum. 
MEMORANDUM 
GERMANE FACTS 
1. The principal issue sought to be reviewed in this case is whether a 
hospital's factual incident reports, created contemporaneously with an event 
causing injury to a patient, are discoverable. 
2. Appellants filed their petition for permission to appeal interlocutory 
order on June 10, 2004. Rule 5, URAP, required them to do so at that time. A 
later filed petition would have been untimely. 
3. Unfortunately, discovery germane to the issue on appeal was not 
completed at the time this Court granted appellant's petition (on June 28, 2004). 
4. The district court's denial of Plaintiff's motion to compel production of 
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the incident reports was based entirely on a conclusory assertion in an affidavit of 
the hospital's risk manager that the incident reports were "not created or used for 
any purpose other than for evaluating or improving . . . health care." The district 
court stated: "in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that 
the reports are privileged." 
5. Immediately following the district court's denial of their motion, 
Plaintiffs undertook additional discovery to test the accuracy of the assertion of the 
hospital's risk manager. They attempted to depose the risk manager and to 
depose all persons with knowledge and information as to the identity of persons 
who have seen the incident reports. The hospital declined to cooperate in this 
discovery and Plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel. This motion to compel 
was granted. However, there was some mixup in mailing the minute entry 
notifying Plaintiffs of the grant of that motion. Having not received a copy of the 
minute entry granting their second motion to compel, counsel for the Plaintiffs 
wrote the district court on June 4, 2004 requesting a ruling on the motion. In 
response, the Plaintiffs received on July 7, a minute entry dated July 6, 2004 
stating: 
The Motion to Compel requests that the defense be 
compelled to produce for deposition Linda Wright and ail 
other representatives who have information responsive to 
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plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6)[sic] deposition notice. 
This Court ruled on plaintiffs' Motion by way of Minute Entry 
and Order on May 21, 2004. At that time, the Court granted 
plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.... 
(See Exhibit "A", attached). 
6. Before the grant of their second motion to compel, Plaintiffs had 
served on the Hospital two admission requests and two interrogatories. The 
Hospital declined to answer those discovery requests other than by objecting to 
them. The admission requests and interrogatories asked the Hospital to admit 
that its incident reports had been seen by counsel representing the Hospital in this 
wrongful death action and requested the identity of every person who had seen 
the incident reports. (See Exhibits "B" and "C", attached). 
7. Recently, Plaintiffs filed with the district a third motion to compel 
asking that the Hospital be compelled to provide responses to the admission 
requests and interrogatories and to produce their risk manager and other 
employees for the requested Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (See Exhibit "D", 
attached). 
8. The Hospital has taken the position that no discovery should be 
allowed during the pendency of the appeal based on the fact that appellants' relief 
request in its petition for permission to appeal asks this Court to: 
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Either itself decide the pending motion to 
compel discovery of the facts concerning 
who has seen and "used" the incident 
reports the Hospital refuses to produce to 
plaintiffs or order the district court to rule on 
the motion without further delay. 
(See p. 10 of Appellants' Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, 
H3). 
9. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs/Appellants, the district court had already 
ruled (favorably) on the motion to compel discovery. That ruling, however, did not 
address the Hospital's failure to answer the admission requests and 
interrogatories because that failure had not occurred at the time the motion had 
been submitted. 
10. In their Petition for Permission Appeal Interlocutory Order, Appellants 
expressly included the following relief request: 
4. Allow plaintiffs a limited period of time to 
conduct the discovery they seek to conduct for 
the purpose of presenting sufficient factual 
information to enable this Court to determine 
whether the incident reports truly were prepared 
solely for care-review purposes as alleged by 
the hospital's risk manager and whether, even if 
they were, they should be shown to plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
(See Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, p. 10, ft4). 
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I. 
JUSTICE WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY ALLOWING 
APPELLANTS TO CONCLUDE THE DISCOVERY 
PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND DIRECTING 
THE DISTRICT COURT TO SEE THAT THE DISCOVERY IS 
COMPLETED. 
Rule 5(a), URAP requires that an appeal from an interlocutory order be filed 
within 20 days after entry of the order. Had appellants waited until they had 
received appropriate responses to the outstanding discovery requests relating to 
the issue on appeal, their appeal would have been time-barred. The Hospital's 
refusal to produce its risk manager for deposition and to respond forthrightly to 
Appellants' admission requests and interrogatories has placed Appellants 
between the proverbial "rock and a hard place." 
Unquestionably, this Court will be better able fairly to decide the issue on 
appeal if it has before it all the relevant facts. In deciding whether the Hospital 
should be compelled to produce its incident reports, it is important for this Court to 
know whether the Hospital's counsel in this suit has seen those incident reports. It 
is also important for this Court to know who else has seen the incident reports and 
for what purposes. 
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II. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE GRANTED AN 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH 
TO FILE THEIR APPEAL BRIEF. 
Appellants have been notified their appeal brief is due on September 3. 
They seek an extension solely for the purpose of concluding outstanding 
discovery relating to the issue on appeal. Appellants have not previously sought 
or been granted an enlargement of time within which to file their appeal brief. 
They ask that they be granted until 30 days after they have received the Hospital's 
responses to their two admission requests and interrogatories and have deposed 
the Hospital's risk manager and Rule 30(b)(6) designees to file their appeal brief. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUEST 
Appellants ask this Court to direct the district court to compel the Hospital to 
comply promptly with the district court's order allowing the Plaintiffs to depose the 
Hospital's risk manager and Rule 30(b)(6) designees and to compel the Hospital 
to respond to the Plaintiffs' two outstanding admission requests and 
interrogatories. Appellants ask that a deadline be set for the completion of that 
discovery. Appellants ask that they be given until 30 days after such discovery 
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has been completed to file their appeal brief. 
Dated this ' day of August, 2004. 
^ 4 ^ 
Douglas G. Mortenser 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the ? day of August, 2004 I caused to be delivered via the following 
method a copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Elizabeth L Willey 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
/ U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile -363-0400 
• Hand-Delivered 
• Federal Express 
LAAAAA^ / O L - O U ^ A A ^ C V ^ . 
\\2kservertcommon\My Files\Cannon, Gary\Appeal\Pidg Mtn to allow additional discovery.0806.wpd 
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Exhibit H 
DAVID W. SLAGLE (2975) 
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY (5639) 
BRADLEY R. BLACKHAM (8703) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHRYN CANNON, as surviving 
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, 
LANE CANNON and ROLAND 
CANNON, as surviving children and legal 
heirs of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 
APPEAL BRIEF AND TO ALLOW 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
CaseNo.20040486-CA 
Third Judicial District Court 
Civil No. 020914614 
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton 
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center ("Salt Lake Regional") submits the following 
memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Brief and to 
Allow Additional Discovery. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is a medical malpractice case arising from treatment and care rendered to 
decedent Gary Cannon while he was a patient at Salt Lake Regional from May 16, 2001 through 
May 21,2001. (Compl.) 
2. On January 6,2003, plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents on Salt Lake Regional. (Pis/ First Set of Interrogs. and Req. for Prod, of 
Docs.) 
3. Plaintiffs' first set of requests for production of documents includes a request for each 
incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's fall while he was a patient at Salt Lake 
Regional. (Id.) 
4. On February 24, 2003, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Salt Lake Regional specifically objected 
to plaintiffs' request for each incident report on the grounds of peer review and the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis. First Set 
of Interrogs. and Req. for Produc. of Docs.) 
5. On October 24,2003, plaintiffs served a motion to compel production of any incident 
report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's fall at Salt Lake Regional. ("First Motion to 
Compel"). (Pis.' First Mot. to Compel.) 
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6. On November 16, 2003, Salt Lake Regional served its memorandum in opposition 
to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Supporting Salt Lake Regional's memorandum is the affidavit 
of Linda Wright, who is the director of risk management at Salt Lake Regional. (Salt Lake Reg'l 
Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' First Mot. to Compel.) 
7. On December 5,2003, plaintiffs served a reply memorandum in support of their First 
Motion to Compel and submitted the motion to the trial court for decision. Plaintiffs did not request 
additional time to conduct discovery prior to submitting their First Motion to Compel for decision. 
(Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pis.' First Mot. to Compel; Pis.' Not. to Submit for Decision.) 
8. On March 4, 2004, the trial court issued an unsigned and undated minute entry 
("Minute Entry 1") denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. In Minute Entry 1, the trial court 
acknowledged that the only evidence presented was the affidavit of Linda Wright. The trial court 
ruled that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, any existing incident reports are privileged. 
(Minute Entry 1, attached as Exhibit A.) 
9. On March 15,2004, plaintiffs served requests for admission on Salt Lake Regional. 
Plaintiffs specifically requested that Salt Lake Regional admit the following: (1) that any existing 
incident reports have been seen by Salt Lake Regional's counsel; and (2) that any existing incident 
reports have been seen by individually named attorneys representing Salt Lake Regional. (Pis.' Req. 
for Admis. and Second Set of Interrogs.) 
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10. On March 15,2004, plaintiffs served their second set of interrogatories on Salt Lake 
Regional. Plaintiffs specifically requested the following information: (1) the basis for any refusal 
to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' requests for admission; (2) the names of every person 
having knowledge of the grounds for Salt Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified 
in plaintiffs' request for admission; (3) the identity of each document supporting Salt Lake 
Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions; and (4) the 
names of every person who has seen any existing incident report. (Id.) 
11. On March 18,2004, plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, served a notice of deposition of the following individuals: (1) "[e]ach person who has 
knowledge or information as to the identity of each person who has seen or may have seen the 
incident report(s) which Salt Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action;" 
and (2) "[ejach and every person who has at any time seen the incident reports Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center has refused to produce in this action pertaining to the fall on or about May 18,2001 
of patient Gary R. Cannon...." ("Rule 30(b)(6) deponents"). (Pis.' Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Dep.) 
12. On March 18, 2004, plaintiffs also served a notice of deposition of Linda Wright. 
(Pis.' Notice of Dep. of Linda Wright.) 
13. On March 19, 2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter 
regarding plaintiffs' March 18, 2004 notices of depositions. Based on the trial court's ruling in 
Minute Entry 1, counsel for Salt Lake Regional refused to produce either Linda Wright or the Rule 
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30(b)(6) deponents without an order from the trial court. (3/19/04 Willey Letter, attached as Exhibit 
B.) 
14. On March 24, 2004, plaintiffs served a motion to compel the depositions of Linda 
Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents ("Second Motion to Compel"). Plaintiffs argued that 
Minute Entry 1 invites discovery into the accuracy of Linda Wright's affidavit testimony. (Pis.' 
Second Mot. to Compel.) 
15. On March 24,2004, plaintiffs also served an objection to Minute Entry 1. Plaintiffs 
specifically objected because Minute Entry 1 was not dated and signed. Plaintiffs requested that the 
trial court not sign and enter Minute Entry 1 until it had resolved plaintiffs' Second Motion to 
Compel. (Pis' Objection to Minute Entry 1.) 
16. On March 29,2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional received a signed copy of Minute 
Entry 1 ("Minute Entry 2") that is dated March 4,2004. (Minute Entry 2, attached as Exhibit C.) 
17. On March 31, 2004, Salt Lake Regional served its memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Salt Lake Regional argued that it reasonably relied on Minute 
Entry 1 and applicable statutory and case law in refusing to produce Linda Wright and the Rule 
30(b)(6) deponents for depositions. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' Second Mot. to 
Compel.) 
18. On April 16, 2004, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' requests for 
admission. Salt Lake Regional objected to both requests for admission on the grounds of attorney 
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client privilege; work product doctrine; Minute Entry 1; and the statutes and case law cited in Salt 
Lake Regional's memoranda in opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel and Second Motion 
to Compel. (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' First Set of Req. for Admis., attached as Exhibit D.) 
19. On April 16, 2004, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories. In response to plaintiffs' first interrogatory, Salt Lake Regional identified the 
grounds for its refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions; 
identified counsel for both parties and Judge Atherton as individuals with knowledge supporting Salt 
Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions; and 
referred plaintiffs to Minute Entry 1 and the statutes and cases cited in Salt Lake Regional's 
memoranda in opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel and Second Motion to Compel as 
documents supporting Salt Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' 
request for admissions. (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' Second Set of Interrogs., attached as 
Exhibit E.) 
20. On May 21, 2004, the trial court issued a minute entry ("Minute Entry 3") granting 
in part Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs "are 
entitled to depose Linda Wright." Minute Entry 3 is silent with respect to plaintiffs' request for an 
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order compelling the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents.1 (Minute Entry 3, attached as 
Exhibit F.) 
21. On May 21,2004, the trial court issued a separate minute entry ("Minute Entry 4") 
clarifying Minute Entry 1. The trial court explained that Minute Entry 1 had been signed and entered 
on March 4, 2004 but that the copies initially sent to counsel were undated and unsigned. To 
preserve plaintiffs' right to file an interlocutory appeal, the trial court re-entered an order denying 
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel on May 21,2004. Minute Entry 4 did not alter the substance of 
Minute Entry 1 or otherwise change the trial court's stated reasons for denying plaintiffs' First 
Motion to Compel. (Minute Entry 4, attached as Exhibit G.) 
22. On June 4,2004, plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the trial court inquiring as to the 
status of plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. The letter reflects plaintiffs' counsel's belief that the 
trial court had not yet ruled on plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. (6/4/04 Mortensen Letter.) 
*It should be noted that on plaintiffs incorrectly represent and imply in their 
memorandum that the trial court ordered the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. 
Plaintiffs acknowledged in a recent memorandum filed with the trial court that Minute Entry 3 
"does not specifically grant the plaintiffs' [sic] the right to depose other representatives under 
plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) motion," but they go on to argue that a subsequent minute entry dated 
July 6,2004 "implies" that the trial court granted plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel as it 
pertains to the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. In their memorandum filed with this Court, however, 
plaintiffs have not drawn any distinction between the trial court's actual orders and plaintiffs' 
interpretation of those orders. 
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23. On June 10,2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's 
order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (Pis.' Pet. for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory 
Order.) 
24. On June 28,2004, this Court granted plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal of 
the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (Order granting Pis.' Pet. for 
Interlocutory Appeal.) 
25. On July 6,2004, the trial court issued a minute entry ("Minute Entry 5") in response 
to the June 4,2004 letter from plaintiffs' counsel regarding the status of plaintiffs' Second Motion 
to Compel. In Minute Entry 5, the trial court explained that it had already ruled on plaintiffs' Second 
Motion to Compel in Minute Entry 3. The Court attached a copy of Minute Entry 3 to Minute Entry 
5. Minute Entry 5 did not alter the substance of Minute Entry 3. (Minute Entry 5, attached as 
Exhibit H.) 
26. Plaintiffs' counsel admits that he received Minute Entry 3 by July 7,2004. (7/9/04 
Mortensen Letter, attached as Exhibit I.) 
27. On July 9, 2004, plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, served their Certification of Absence of Transcript and Statement of Issues to be 
Presented on Appeal. (Pis.' Cert, of Absence of Transcript and Statement of Issues to be Presented 
on Appeal, attached as Exhibit J.) 
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28. Plaintiffs identified the primary issue on appeal as whether any existing incident 
report is discoverable. (Id.) 
29. Plaintiffs identified a secondary issue on appeal as whether Salt Lake Regional 
"should be compelled to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests (including interrogatories and 
admission requests) seeking to ascertain the identity and job description of all persons who have seen 
the incident reports and the purposes for which such reports were disseminated to such persons." 
(Id.) 
30. On July 16,2004, Salt Lake Regional served its Motion for Protective Order and Stay 
of Discovery. Salt Lake Regional moved the trial court for an order staying all discovery relating 
to the existence, substance, nature or dissemination of any existing incident report until the appeals 
process is complete. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mot. for Protective Order and Stay of Disc.) 
31. The grounds for Salt Lake Regional's motion to stay discovery is that it would be 
improper to permit discovery regarding any existing incident reports when the issues of (1) whether 
incident reports are discoverable; and (2) whether Salt Lake Regional is required to comply with 
plaintiffs' discovery requests regarding incident reports are on appeal to this Court. (Id.) 
32. On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs responded to Salt Lake Regional's Motion for 
Protective Order and Stay of Discovery by filing (1) a motion with the trial court to compel 
supplemental responses to plaintiffs' request for admissions and interrogatories and the depositions 
of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents ('Third Motion to Compel"); and (2) the present 
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motion for extension of time and an order compelling discovery before this Court. (Pis/ Third 
Motion to Compel; Pis.' Mot. for Extension of Time Within Which to File Appeal Brief and to 
Allow Additional Discovery and Supp. Mem.) 
ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, motions for an enlargement of time for filing 
an appellate brief "are not favored." Utah R. App. P. 22(b). Furthermore, a motion for extension 
of time may be granted only upon a showing of good cause. Id. Plaintiffs' request for an 
enlargement so that they can conduct more discovery is not supported by good cause and goes 
against the well established role of appellate courts. 
I. NEW EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
This Court has repeatedly stated that it does not hear or consider new evidence on appeal. 
InreL.M.,2001 UTApp314,Tfl6n.3,37?3dl\SS;Lyons v.Booker, 1999UTApp 172, f 2,982 
P.2d 1142; State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Otteson v. Dep't of Human 
Serv., Office ofSoc. Serv., 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah Ct App. 1997); Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 
P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Court has been stringent in applying this rule. For 
example, the Court refused to consider a rape victim's affidavit testimony in which she recanted trial 
testimony used to convict the defendant. Vessey, 967 P.2d at 966 (striking new testimony and 
concluding that defendant failed to show that his conviction was not supported by sufficient 
evidence). 
1 
The reasons supporting a strict application of the rule against consideration of new evidence 
on appeal go to the fundamental difference between trial courts and appellate courts. Trial courts 
have "an advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Utah Med. Prod., 
Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998). For this reason, trial courts "are given primary 
responsibility for making determinations of fact." Am. Fork City v. Singleton, 2002 UT App 331, 
f 5, 57 P.3d 1124. On the other hand, appellate courts are charged with the responsibility of 
"examining the record for evidence supporting the judgment." Shioji v. Shioji, 111 P.2d 197,201 
(Utah 1986). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the differing roles of trial and appellate courts as follows: 
The appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and 
uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters. It is 
inappropriate for an appellate court to disregard the trial court's 
findings of fact and to assume the role of weighing evidence and 
making its own findings of fact. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 19, 52 P.3d 1158 (concluding that the court of appeals "exceeded 
its proper role" by finding facts beyond those found by the trial court) (quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, % 10, 57 P.3d 1111 (refusing 
appellant's request to supplement the trial court's factual findings). In Bailey, the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted with approval the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum: 
The reviewing court is confined to the facts specially found by the 
trial court, and the reviewing court may not make findings of fact for 
or against appellant, and cannot consider evidence to find facts or 
2 
make a decision upon them or supplement the facts found by the trial 
court with any additional facts 
2002 UT 58 at Tf 19 (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, § 710 (1993) (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
Here, plaintiffs have appealed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel 
production of any existing incident reports. See Pis.' Pet. for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory 
Order; Exhibit A (Minute Entry 1); Exhibit G (Minute Entry 4). In support of their motion for an 
extension of time to file an appeal brief and for an order compelling additional discovery, plaintiffs 
argue that "this Court will be better able to fairly decide the issue on appeal if it has before it all the 
relevant facts." Pis.' Mot. for Extension of Time Within Which to File Appeal Br. and to Allow 
Additional Discovery and Supp. Mem., p. 6. Thus, plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to file 
their appeal brief is contingent upon their additional request for an order compelling discovery. 
Plaintiffs' underlying request for an order compelling discovery so that they can present 
supplemental evidence to this Court for consideration should be denied because new evidence may 
not be considered on appeal. The only evidence presented to the trial court for consideration in 
connection with plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel is the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright, which 
was submitted in support of Salt Lake Regional's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' First 
Motion to Compel. See Exhibit A. Furthermore, the trial court's Minute Entry 1 clearly indicates 
that the only facts considered by the court were those contained in Ms. Wright's affidavit. Id. It was 
3 
not until after the trial court first denied plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel (hat plaintiffs sought 
additional discovery. 
Under well established rules of appellate court procedure, this Court may not consider 
evidence other than the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright. While plaintiffs may believe other as-
of-yet undiscovered evidence may be relevant, this Court is not at liberty to supplement Ms. 
Wright's affidavit testimony with other evidence that was not considered by the trial court; weigh 
Ms. Wright's affidavit testimony against other evidence not considered by the trial court; or allow 
further discovery on the appealable issues so that the appellate record may be supplemented. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery should be denied. Because 
plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery is improper and should be denied, there is no 
good cause for allowing plaintiffs additional time to file their appeal brief. Therefore, plaintiffs' 
motion should be denied in its entirety. 
II. PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT SEEK AN ORDER COMPELLING 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY WHEN THE 
LEGALITY OF THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS IS AN ISSUE TO BE 
PRESENTED AND ARGUED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs' motion should be denied for additional reasons. First, plaintiffs' request for an 
order compelling discovery is improper because the legality of plaintiffs' discovery requests is an 
issue on appeal. After receiving the trial court's orders denying their First Motion to Compel and 
partially granting their Second Motion to Compel, plaintiffs filed a statement of issues to be argued 
on appeal. See Exhibit J. Plaintiffs identified the following secondary issue on appeal: Whether 
4 
Salt Lake Regional "should be compelled to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests (including 
interrogatories and admission requests) seeking to ascertain the identity and job description of all 
persons who have seen the incident reports and the purposes for which such reports were 
disseminated to such persons." Id. Thus, plaintiffs are appealing the very issue that is the subject 
of this motion-whether Salt Lake Regional should be compelled to provide supplemental responses 
to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests for admission. 
Because the relief requested by plaintiffs in their motion is an issue to be decided on appeal, 
it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant plaintiffs' motion before the parties have briefed and 
argued the underlying merits of plaintiffs' discovery requests in their appellate briefs and during oral 
argument. Underlying plaintiffs' motion and the issue on appeal is the issue of whether Salt Lake 
Regional appropriately and justifiably relied on the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product 
doctrine, Utah's care-review privilege and other objections in responding to plaintiffs' second set 
of interrogatories and requests for admission. Because these issues are the subject of appeal and 
have not yet been briefed or argued, plaintiffs' motion should be denied. 
HI. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
Plaintiffs' motion should also be denied because they have failed to adequately brief the 
merits of the underlying discovery requests. Salt Lake Regional has raised numerous legal 
objections to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests for admission, including the 
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and the care-review privilege. See Exhibits 
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D & E. Plaintiffs have wholly failed to present any argument as to whether the privileges and 
objections asserted by Salt Lake Regional apply and preclude discovery of the information 
requested. In the absence of any argument on the underlying merits of plaintiffs' request for an order 
to compel discovery, the request should be denied. See State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, % 11,974 P.2d 
269 ("[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." (Quotations and citations omitted)). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT RULED ON THE ISSUE 
Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery should also be denied because the trial 
court has two motions pending before it on the same issue. In particular, Salt Lake Regional has 
filed a motion for protective order and stay of all discovery relating to incident reports. In addition, 
plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery related to incident reports. As the court with the 
primary responsibility for managing this case, the trial court should be permitted to rule on the 
pending motions without interference from this Court. Only after the trial court has ruled on the 
issues presented in the pending motions would an interlocutory review by this Court or the Utah 
Supreme Court be appropriate. 
V. PLAINTIFFS CHOSE THE TIMING OF THEIR APPEAL 
Plaintiffs' argument that they have been placed between a rock and a hard spot is also 
without merit. This is an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs are the ones who chose to petition for 
6 
appellate review of an interlocutory order while discovery remains to be conducted. After making 
that choice, plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain that more discovery needs to be completed. 
Furthermore, it was plaintiffs who chose not to pursue any discovery related to incident reports prior 
to moving the trial court for an order compelling the production of any existing incident reports. 
Even after Salt Lake Regional submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in opposition to plaintiffs' 
First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs did not request time for additional discovery before submitting 
their motion to the trial court for decision. Any difficulties that plaintiffs find themselves in with 
respect to the record on appeal are of their own making and do not warrant an extension of time to 
file an appeal brief or an order compelling discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling additional discovery should be denied because 
new evidence may not be considered on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion should also be denied because 
the issue presented in plaintiffs' motion is the same issue to be decided on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion 
is also inadequately briefed. Furthermore, the trial court has not had an opportunity to decide the 
issue. In the absence of good cause shown, plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to file their 
appeal brief and for an order compelling discovery should be denied. 
7 
DATED this £ k day of August, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^ W & / ? f . $J*«AA***pS By. 
David W. Sl<gle 
Elizabeth W. Willey 
Bradley R. Blackham 
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 
Inc. 
020440-0051\bri)\54833.wpd 
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pending motions without interference from this Court. Only after the trial court has ruled on the 
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Plaintiffs' argument that they have been placed between a rock and a hard spot is also 
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appellate review of an interlocutory order while discovery remains to be conducted. After making 
that choice, plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain that more discovery needs to be completed. 
Furthermore, it was plaintiffs who chose not to pursue any discovery related to incident reports prior 
to moving the trial court for an order compelling the production of any existing incident reports. 
Even after Salt Lake Regional submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in opposition to plaintiffs' 
First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs did not request time for additional discovery before submitting 
their motion to the trial court for decision. Any difficulties that plaintiffs find themselves in with 
respect to the record on appeal are of their own making and do not warrant an extension of time to 
file an appeal brief or an order compelling discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling additional discovery should be denied because 
new evidence may not be considered on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion should also be denied because 
the issue presented in plaintiffs' motion is the same issue to be decided on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion 
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Salt Lake Regional Medical ) 
Center, Inc.; John and Jane ) 
Does I through X and Doe ) 
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Defendants and Appellees. ) 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson 
This is before the court on Appellants1 Motion for Extension 
of Time Within Which to File Appeal Brief and to Allow Additional 
Discovery. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants1 motion is denied. 
Appellants1 brief is due thirty days from the date of this order. 
Dated this day of September, 2004. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
ORDER 
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Search Terms: bradburn and rockingham and memorial 
Norman L. Bradburn, Sr. v. Rockingham Memorial Hospital 
Case No. (Law) 10636 
CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
45 Va. Cir. 356; 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85 
April 17, 1998, Decided 
HEADNOTES: 
HEADNOTE: Hospital incident reports that are mere recitations of objective facts and hospital policy and 
procedures manuals that are the final result of hospital staff deliberations are not exempt from discovery 
under §8.01-581.17. 
JUDGES: [**1] By Judge John J. McGrath, Jr. 
OPINIONBY: McGrath 
OPINION: [*356] 
In this medical malpractice action, Plaintiff has brought suit against Rockingham Memorial Hospital alleging 
that the negligence of its employees caused him to suffer a tripartite fracture of his hip on May 9, 1994, as 
the result of a fall from a hospital bed. It is the Plaintiff's contention that the staff of Rockingham Memorial 
Hospital had improperly provided for his safety and security when he was placed unrestrained in a bed after 
his physicians had allegedly ordered that bed restraints be used to prevent the Plaintiff from exiting his bed. 
Counsel for the parties have completed most of the discovery in the case, and the matter now brought before 
the Court includes the relatively narrow issues presented by the discoverability of two separate classes of 
documents. First, the Plaintiff seeks certain Policies, Procedures, and Protocols of the Defendant which 
specifically relate to fall prevention, vest restraints, nursing rounds, and post-incident care of patients. The 
Plaintiff seeks a second class of documents which are genericaliy referred to as to the Incident Reports or 
Accident Reports prepared immediately after the [**2] incident which gave rise to this cause of action. 
The Defendant resists production of either of these two types of documents on the grounds that they are 
privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended. In addition, Defendant asserts 
that its Policies, Procedures, and Protocols manuals are not discoverable because they are irrelevant as a 
matter of law under the holding in Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983). 
[*357] An evidentiary hearing was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discover/ Responses. At this 
hearing, the Defendant produced two witnesses and a number of exhibits in support of its contention that 
both classes of documents should be and are privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia. The first 
witness called by the Defendant was Mrs. Young, who is the Director of Quality Management for 
Rockingham Memorial Hospital and also is a member of the Safety and Risk Management Committee of the 
Hospital. She gave an overview description of how the quality control assessmenr process works at the 
hospital. Her testimony was essentially that all untoward incidents which might give rise to liability which 
occur within the hospital [**3] are required to be reported by staff on a form that is variously known as a 
"Pink Sheet," a QCCR, or a QCR. These are the various names used for Incident Reports which are prepared 
hUp://\veb.Jexis-nexis.cornyuniverse/document?^m=15423fl91c5cb425eb51be0b979848f5... 12/2/2003 
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document Page 2 of 5 
by one or more staff members who are witnesses to or are involved in an accident. After these Incident 
Reports are completed, they are either reviewed on an individual basis or they are aggregated for statistical 
tracking and analysis by the various inter-disciplinary committees of the hospital which have, as part of their 
function, the monitoring and promulgation of quality assurance practices. 
Mrs. Young further testified that the Policies, Procedures, and Protocols of the hospital are developed by 
various working committees and work their way through the inter-disciplinary committees and the medical 
staff peer review committees and are eventually promulgated as Policies and Procedures by the Board of 
Directors or Directing Manager upon the recommendation of the Quality Assessment and Improvement 
Committee. According to Mrs. Young, the Procedures of the hospital are more detailed documents generated 
for use at the department level, which lay out the specific manner in which the generalized Policies are [**4] 
to be applied in day-to-day activities. 
Dr. Danny A. Neal, who is the current Chairman of the Medical Executive Committee of Rockingham 
Memorial Hospital, testified at length on the importance of the quality assessment and review procedures 
utilized at Rockingham Memorial Hospital and more particularly as utilized by the Medical Staff. Dr. NeaPs 
testimony was essentially that the various medical groups operating within the hospital and the hospital 
Board of Directors and management rely heavily upon the various quaiity assurance committees that have 
been established, and these committees, in turn, rely upon the unfettered access to information from 
employees and medical staff members. It was Dr. Neal's testimony that, in his judgment and experience, the 
materials which were generated by the staff were of better quality and more usable for quality control 
purposes when the staff and employees were assured that whatever [*358] information they generated 
would be free from discovery by legal process and possible use in litigation against them or their employer. 
Although the record is not exactly clear on this issue, it appears that individual Incident Reports are not 
always examined [**5] in detail by the Medical Executive Committee, but they are frequently utilized by the 
lower echelon committees to examine trends and are a basis for statistical analysis to determine what areas 
require additional attention from a quality assurance perspective. 
The statutory provisions involved in this case are set forth in § 8.01-581.16 and 8.01-581.17 of the Code of 
Virginia. 
Section 8.01-581.17 provides that: 
The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any (i) medical staff committee, utilization review 
committee, or other committee as specified in § 8.01-581.16... together with all communications, both oral 
and written, originating in or provided to such committees or entities, are privileged communications which 
may not be disclosed or obtained by legal discovery proceedings unless a circuit court, after a hearing and for 
good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings, 
minutes, records, reports, or communications. Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any 
privilege to hospitai medical records kept with respect to any patient in the ordinary course of business of 
operating a hospital nor to [**6] any facts or information contained in such records, nor shall this section 
preclude or affect discovery of or production of evidence relating to hospitalization or treatment of any 
patient in the ordinary course of hospitalization of such patient. 
Section 8.01-581.16 provides that the "Committees" which are covered by the privilege of § 8.01-581.17 are 
"any committee, board, group, commission or other entity which functions primarily to review, evaluate, 
make recommendations on... (iv) the adequacy or quality of professional services...." 
Since the two classes of documents at issue in this case raise somewhat different legal issues, they will be 
treated separately. 
I. Discoverability of Incident Reports 
The QCRs, QCCRs, or "Pink Sheets" (which hereinafter will be referred to simply as "Incident Reports") are 
prepared by staff personnel whenever there is an untoward incident which occurs at the hospital. These 
Incident Reports are then forwarded to various quality assurance committees. The [*359] testimonv in this 
case was that such an Incident Report was prepared immediately after Mr. Bradburn had suffered nis fall by 
one or more of the nurses who were attending on the [**7] ward when he was injured. No other accident or 
incident report was prepared by anyone employed by the hospital. 
The Defendant's position is that all of these Incident Reports are clearly privileged under the previsions of § 
8.01-581.17 because they are "communications... originating in or provided to a committee, board, group, 
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commission, or other entity which functions primarily to review, evaluate, or make recommendations on... 
(iv) the adequacy or quality of professional services...." The Defendant contends that these Incident Reports 
are an integral part of the overall quality assurance or quality assessment process that has been established 
within the hospital to assure high quality medical care. In essence, the Defendant argues that these Incident 
Reports are the raw material which is supplied to the various quality assurance committees to be reviewed 
and to be analyzed for the purposes of maintaining or improving the quality of medical care rendered at the 
hospital. 
The Plaintiffs contention is that these Incident Reports are not part of the deliberative quality control process 
and are not within the scope of the privilege as intended by the legislature. The Plaintiffs [**8] position is 
that it was never the intention of the legislature to extend a quality assurance privilege to routine, factual 
reports which record the time, place, date, witnesses, and observations relating to a particular incident. The 
Plaintiffs position is that the privilege is meant to protect the give and take of the deliberative process and 
the self-searching review conducted by quality control committees. 
There appear to be no appellate cases in Virginia clearly articulating the metes and bounds of the privilege 
set forth in § 8.01-581.17 when dealing with incident reports relating to accidents which occur in medical 
facilities. There has been a substantial number of cases decided at the Circuit Court level, and they are more 
or less evenly divided on the question of whether such incident reports are privileged within the meaning of § 
8.01-581.17. Plaintiff points to a number of decisions which have held that incident reports such as the ones 
involved in this case, even when they are supplied directly and exclusively to quality assurance or quality 
control committees, are not covered by the privilege because they do not contain any of the normal 
deliberative processes which [**9] the legislature intended to protect in the statute. See, e.g., Huffman v. 
Beverly Calif. Corp., 42 Va. Cir. 205 (Rockingham County, 1997) (McGrath, J.); Messerley v. Avante Group, 
Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26 (Rockingham County, 1966) (McGrath, J.); Roadcap v. Beverley Enterprises, Inc. 
(Rockingham County, 1996) (Hupp, J.); Benedict v. Community Hosp. of [*360] Roanoke Valley, 10 Va. 
Cir. 430 (City of Roanoke, 1988) (Coulter, J.); Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (City of 
Roanoke, 1987) (Coulter, J.); and Atkinson v. Thomas, 9 Va. Cir. 21 (City of Virginia Beach, 1986) (Russo, 
J.). 
The Defendant cites to a number of circuit court opinions which have held that incident reports such as the 
one involved here are covered by the quality assurance deliberative privilege set forth in § 8.01-581.17. See, 
e.g., Jones v. Rezba (City of Winchester, 1997) (Wetsel, J.); Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499 (City of 
Petersburg, 1996) (Lemons, J.); Adams v. Patterson (City of Winchester, 1994) (Wetsel, J.); Mangano v. 
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Loudoun County, 1993) (Home, J.); Houchens v. University of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 
202 (City of Charlottesville, 1991) (Swett, J.); Hedgepeth v. [**10] Jesudian, 15 Va. Cir. 352 (City of 
Richmond, 1989) (Markow, J.); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. System, Inc., 28 Va. Cir. 560 (Fairfax County, 1988) 
(McWeeny, J.); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. i26 (Henrico County, 1987) (Kulp, J.); Peck v. Chippenham 
Hosp., Inc. (Medical Malpractice Review Panel, City of Richmond, 1986) (Nance, J.). 
After reviewing all of these decisions and the evidentiary record established in the hearing on the instant 
motion, this Court continues to believe that the position as set forth in Huffman v. Beverly Calif, Corp., 42 Va. 
Cir. 205 (1997), and Messerley v. Avante Group, 42 Va. Cir. 26 (1996), is an accurate statement and 
interpretation of the applicable law. In the Huffman and Messerly opinions, this Court indicated that records 
such as these, which are standard incident reports that are filed for any accident occurring at a medical 
facility, are not shielded from discovery by the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 because they do not rise to the 
level as contemplated by the statute of being quality assurance deliberative documents. They are simply 
recitations of the accident that occurred, the witnesses who were present, and other objective facts that can 
be ascertained [**11] from the eyewitnesses to the incident. As such, they are much more akin to the 
ordinary hospital records, which are exempted from the reach of this privilege pursuant to the last sentence 
of §8.01-581.17. 
It is certainly clear that the legislature has determined as a matter of public policy in Virginia that many of 
the documents utilized in, by, and with quality assurance organizations within medical facilities are to be 
exempt from discovery (absent a showing of special need) in order to facilitate the free flow of information 
between staff personnel and quality assurance committees. Although that is a commendable objective and 
needs to be adhered to whenever the deliberative process is involved, it appears to be an [*361J 
impermissible reading of the statute to extend this privilege to cover all factual reports or incident reports of 
accidents that happen at a hospital simply because they are sent to a quality assurance committee. 
The basis of this Court's decision was set forth very well by Judge Coulter in his decision in Benedict v. 
Community Hosp., 10 Va. Cir. 430 (1988), when he stated: 
Utp://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=15423fl91c5cb425eb51be0b979848f5... 12/2/2003 
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The argument that all field work, the incident reports, the questions concerning [**12] falls that might 
proceed a peer review meeting should be free from discovery... must yield to the more compelling mandate 
of the statute's last sentence. Otherwise, all documents could become privileged simply by the committee 
requiring their production or attaching them to the minutes. As stated in Johnson: "almost anything could 
come within such broad and limitless sweep." Id. at page 436. 
Therefore, the Defendant, Rockingham Memorial Hospital, will be ordered to produce within ten days of 
this Order copies of all incident reports that have been requested by the Plaintiff. 
I I . Discoverability of the Defendant's Policies, Procedures, and Protocols 
The Plaintiffs position at this the discovery stage of the litigation is that he is entitled to obtain the policies, 
procedures, and protocols of Rockingham Memorial Hospital relating to fall prevention, vest restraints, 
nursing rounds, and post-incident care of patients involved in such incidents because (1) these policies, 
procedures, and protocols are not "the proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of a medical staff 
committee or utilization review committee or other committee specified in § 8.01-581.16" nor are they 
communications [**13] originating in or provided to such committees; and (2) the fact that such policies, 
procedures, and protocols may not be introduced into evidence under the Supreme Court's holding in Pullen 
& McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1993), does not mean that such documents cannot be 
obtained in discovery pursuant to Rule 4:1(b)(1). The Plaintiff contends that such information may be 
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." In short, the Plaintiff takes the 
position that it is premature at this point to determine the admissibility into evidence of these documents and 
that discovery should be permitted. 
The Defendant Hospital, on the other hand, argues vigorously that the policies, procedures, and protocols 
established by the hospital are the result of [*362] the peer review process and thus are privileged as a 
written communication originating from such a. committee under the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 of the Code 
of Virginia, and, in addition, are exempt from discovery because they are not likely to result in the discovery 
of admissible evidence because pursuant to § 8.01-581.20 of the Code of Virginia, the standard of care is 
established by statute, and [**14] under the holding.ofthe Supreme Court in Pullen v. Nickens, supra, the 
private rules, regulations:, and procedures established by a party are not admissible in determining whether 
or not che party has met the applicable standard of care. 
As In the case of the decisional authority relating to incident reports, the circuit courts are fairly evenly split 
on the issue of whether policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care providers can be obtained in 
discovery. A number of courts have held that the privilege set forth in § 8.01-581.17 only applies to the 
deliberative processes by which peer review groups establish procedures and protocols and does not extend 
to the final product thereof and that the scope of discovery set forth in Rule 4:1(b)(1) is broad enough to 
permit Plaintiffs to obtain this material in discovery before reaching the issue of whether such materials may 
be introduced at trial. See, e.g., Houchens v. University of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202 (City of Charlottesville, 1991) 
(Swett, J.); Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275 (Fairfax County, 1990) (Annunziata, J.); 
Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va. Cir. 221 (City of Richmond, 1988) (Markow, J.); Johnson v. Roanoke [**15] 
Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (City of Roanoke, 1987) (Coulter, J.). 
The courts which have denied discovery of policy, procedures, and protocol manuals of medical care providers 
have done so on the grounds that either: (1) they are privileged written communications originating from a 
peer review group covered by the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia and/or (2) that the 
internal policies, procedures, and protocols established by a medicai care provider are irrelevant to 
determining whether or not the defendant has violated the statutory mandated standard of care for medical 
care providers. See, e.g., Adams v. Patterson (City of Winchester, 1994) (Wetsel, J.); Mangano v. 
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Loudoun County, 1993) (Home, J.); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 28 
Va. Cir. 560 (Fairfax County, 1988) (McWeeny, J.); Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va. Cir. 127 (City of Alexandria, 
1988) (Swersky, J.); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. 126 (Henrico County, 1987) (Kulp, J.); and Peck v. 
Chippenham Hosp., Inc. (Medical Malpractice Review Panel, City of Richmond, 1986) (Nance, J.). 
On the issue of whether the policies, procedures, and protocol manuals of a medical care [**16] provider are 
privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of [*363] Virginia, this Court believes that the rationale set 
forth by Judge Annunziata in Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275 (1990), and Judge Coulter 
in Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (1987), is the better reasoned analysis of the decided 
cases. Clearly, the internal dialogue and the give and take ofthe peer review process, which lead up to and 
are an integral part of developing the policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care providers are 
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exempted from discovery in the absence of good cause shown. However, the actual product that is generated 
thereby, which are generally policy and procedure manuals that are intended to be followed by all of the 
hospital staff and attending physicians are not part of the deliberative process but are the final result thereof 
and do not share in the privilege conferred by the statute. Therefore, it is this Court's holding that the 
privilege granted by § 8.01-581.17 does not protect from discovery the final result of the peer review 
activity, that is the policies, procedures, and practices manuals that are ultimately promulgated by the 
health [**17] care providers and which are used to govern the operations of the hospital. 
However, given the clearly-delineated statutory standard of care that is set forth in § 8.01-581.20 of the 
Code of Virginia and the still viable holding of the Supreme Court in Pullen v. Nickens, supra, it is extremely 
doubtful that there is any way in which the internal policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care 
providers could be admitted into evidence in this case. To permit such documents into evidence would clearly 
destroy any incentive of medical care providers to adopt internal operating procedures which adopted 
anything but the bare minimum standard. This is exactly the type of chilling effect that the holding in Pullen 
v. Nickens, supra, was meant to prevent. However, at the discovery stage of the litigation, it cannot be said 
with a certainty that these materials will not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence within the purview 
of Rule 4:1(b)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, solely for the purposes of discovery, this Court holds that these materials are to be produced to 
the Plaintiff pursuant to the various discovery requests that have been filed in this case. The [**18] Court 
cautions that what is covered by this Opinion and Order are the final and operative policies, procedures, and 
protocols relating to the subject matter at hand and that this ruling does not extend to any internal 
documentation reflecting the deliberations of the committees or groups which led to the formulation of the 
final policies and procedures that were in place at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Defendant will be 
required to produce these materials to Plaintiff within ten days of this Order. 
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Circuit Court of Virginia. 
Evelyn G. BENEDICT, Claimant 
v. 
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF ROANOKE 
VALLEY, Health Care Provider 
Feb. 29, 1988. 
OPINION 
COULTER, J. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: THE ISSUE 
AND THE BACKGROUND 
*1 The discoverability of incident reports, by 
whatever name called, or their functional 
equivalents, is the issue of the moment in 
these proceedings. Evelyn G. Benedict was a 
patient in the Community Hospital of 
Roanoke Valley from October to December, 
1983, having undergone amputation of the left 
leg below the knee. While recuperating she 
claims that she sustained additional injuries 
to the stump of her leg, apparently as a result 
of three separate events: a blow to the stump 
of her leg during physical therapy on 
November 22, 1983; falling on her stump on 
November 27, 1983, while trying to move 
unattended from her chair to her walker; and 
again striking her abbreviated leg on 
December 4, 1983, when she was dropped by a 
nursing assistant. The claimant seeks to hold 
the hospital responsible for these acts or 
omissions of alleged negligence, contending 
that as a result her healing was delayed, 
additional pain, suffering, and depression 
experienced, and further medical expenses 
incurred. 
On June 7, 1984, Ms. Benedict's attorney 
requested access to all medical records 
relating to her hospitalization and treatment. 
Fifteen months later on October 10, 1985, 
formal notice of a malpractice claim was 
given. The hospital thereupon on December 4, 
1985, requested that the claim be referred to a 
medical review panel. After some discovery 
efforts, an informal hearing on the defendant's 
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objections to the claimant's Interrogatory No. 
7 was held on August 25, 1986, at which time 
the incident reports prepared by the hospital 
were held to be discoverable. This decision 
was in keeping with several similar rulings 
that the court had recently made. No order 
memorializing this decision, however, was 
ever submitted. 
Thereafter the defendant disclosed that 
though an incident report, which it identified 
as a Quality Care Control Report, and a 
"writing" by Charlotte Oliver had been 
prepared contemporaneously with the incident 
or incidents, they were now missing and hence 
could not be produced for discovery purposes. 
Though counsel for the defendant did not 
know that the documents were missing at the 
time he urged their immunity from discovery, 
and no one is suggesting otherwise, the 
claimant raises the nasty specter that they 
could have been conveniently misplaced by 
hospital personnel after resistance to its 
production had proved unavailing— a very 
uncomfortable and unpleasant suspicion the 
validity of which will probably never be 
known. In any event, the defendant in its 
amended answer to Interrogatory No. 7 and 
subsequent memorandum has identified eight 
documents which it concedes could possibly be 
construed as responsive to the claimant's 
interrogatory. 
THE INTERROGATORY AND THE 
AMENDED ANSWER 
Interrogatory No. 7 read as follows: 
(7) Was any Incident Report or similar 
document prepared following any of the 
injuries Mrs. Benedict received involving her 
stump? If so, please describe it and advise 
who has custody of it now. 
The defendant's amended answer and 
subsequent memorandum have disclosed: 
*2 1. Risk Management Review Report 
(prepared after claimant's attorney's request 
to review the medical records on June 7, 
1984). 
2. Routine Questions on Claims Concerning 
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Falls (prepared by Head Nurse Belinda 
Williams after claimant's attorney's request 
to review the medical records). 
3. & 4. Statements of Sharon Saferight, R.N. 
and J. Harper, R.N. (prepared following a 
visit from a member of the claimant's family 
to the hospital on February 1, 1984, seeking 
information about the injuries). 
5. Statement of Nurse Williams (prepared at 
the request of the hospital's in-house attorney 
on May 6, 1984). 
6. Supplemental statement of Nurse Williams 
(prepared at the request of the insurance 
carrier for use by its attorney after the 
claimant's attorney's request to review the 
claimant's medical records). 
7. Statement of Charlotte Oliver, Nursing 
Assistant (prepared at the request of the 
insurance carrier on October 18, 1985, after 
the claimant had filed her formal notice of 
her claim against the hospital). 
8. Transcript of insurance carrier's interview 
with Diane Osborne, Director of Physical 
Therapy (transcribed on February 11,1986, 
for the use of the attorney for the insurance 
carrier.) 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION 
The defendant contends that none of these 
eight documents should be discoverable on the 
following grounds: 
1. That these reports, statements or 
transcripts are privileged within the scope of § 
8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as 
amended. 
2. That these documents were prepared in 
anticipation of litigation and hence are 
entitled to the protection of Rule 4:l(bX3) of 
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
3. That these documents were also prepared 
at the request and for the review of an 
attorney and are accordingly likewise entitled 
to the protection of the same Rule 4:l(bX3). 
THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT: 
MALONE & JOHNSON 
These points and arguments in their support 
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have heretofore been thoroughly and 
painstakingly considered by this court after 
the submission of excellent briefs and 
persuasive arguments involving extensive 
research in two other recent cases: Malone, 
Exec. v. Gill Memorial, City of Roanoke Circuit 
Court Law Action 86-0307, and Johnson, Admx. 
v. Roanoke Memorial Hospitals, Inc., City of 
Roanoke Circuit Court Law Action 87-321. 
In Malone, an operation on the plaintiff's 
decedent, Stella Reamey, for cataracts and a 
lens implant was begun but aborted because of 
the patient's restlessness under anesthesia. 
She was sent to the recovery unit and shortly 
thereafter to her room. Early the next 
morning Ms. Reamey could not be aroused and 
became comatose. She died four months later, 
having never regained consciousness. The 
incident report, recorded statements taken by 
the insurance adjuster, and various manuals 
were held discoverable over vigorous 
objections of the defendant. There was no 
formal written opinion rendered in that case 
but a lengthy oral ruling was delivered from 
the bench, transcribed and made a part of the 
record. 
*3 In Johnson the plaintiff's decedent died at 
age 33 on his way home after being treated for 
a sore throat and released from the emergency 
room of the Roanoke Memorial Hospital. 
There were no incident reports available, but 
the plaintiff sought certain formal Job 
Descriptions for Nurses Aides and Registered 
Nurses and the Care Manual on Triage and 
Nursing Assessment. The court held that 
these documents were discoverable, again over 
the strong arguments of the defendant that 
they were privileged under the same statute 
relied on in this case (§ 8.01-581.17). The 13-
page written opinion, in which ten decisions 
from other jurisdictions upholding the 
discovery of similar material were cited, noted 
at the outset: 
Because of the importance of the issue, the 
tenacity of the defendant's resistance, public 
policy concerns in genuine conflict, and the 
apparent differing attitudes and rulings of 
state trial judges, a review of this court's 
analysis and prior conclusion is justified. The 
matter thus will be considered afresh and 
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subjected to more reasoned review. 
CONCERN FOR CONSISTENCY, THOUGH 
A FACTOR, DOES NOT CREATE 
DISABILITY FOR SELF-
CORRECTION. 
Consistency from the bench is an essential 
ingredient of justice; it is a necessary 
component of a stable jurisprudence. Upon it 
rests the doctrine of stare decisis. Precedent 
would be meaningless without it. Continuity 
of the law and respect for past decisions satisfy 
the need for some certainty and understanding 
of what the law is. Treating litigants equally 
under similar factual situations is simply a 
trademark of AngloAmerican law. And yet, as 
Emerson has so poignantly put it: 
Consistency [FN1] is the hobgoblin of little 
minds, adored by petty statesmen, 
philosophers and divines. 
FN1. It is, of course, a foolish consistency that 
Emerson condemns. 
and 
With consistency a great soul has simply 
nothing to do. He may as well concern 
himself with his shadow on the wall. 
Concern for consistency, therefore, though a 
significant factor, should never inhibit the 
reexamination of complex issues; it should not 
imprison reason nor create disability for self-
correction. The problem, therefore, will again 
be reviewed anew particularly since the 
thrusts of this defendant's arguments are 
somewhat different than those advanced in 
Malone and Johnson. 
THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS 
ANALYZED OXYMORONIA IS NOT THE 
KEY. WHAT IS THE 
"ORDINARY COURSE OF PATIENT 
TREATMENT" IS THE ULTIMATE 
QUESTION. 
In Malone and Johnson the documents sought 
to be discovered, other than the incident 
report, were for the most part materials 
developed after the meetings of peer review 
committees. In the case at bar it is suggested 
that the reports at issue would have preceded 
such meetings. Hence the defendant places 
great emphasis on the provision in § 8.01-
581.17 which grants privilege to "... all 
communications, both oral and written, 
originating in or provided to such committees." 
Since such reports were, in fact, provided to a 
committee or committees that come within the 
protective umbrella of the statute, ergo by 
inescapable logic they are privileged. And so it 
would seem to be except for the last provision 
of this statute which, as in Malone and Johnson, 
must still be reckoned with. 
*4 Nothing in this section shall be construed 
as providing any privilege to hospital medical 
records kept with respect to any patient in the 
ordinary course of business of operating a hospital 
nor to any facts or information contained in 
such records nor shall this section preclude or 
affect discovery of or production of evidence 
relating to hospitalization or treatment of 
any patient in the ordinary course of 
hospitalization of such patients. 
Unlike the arguments presented in Malone 
and Johnson, the defendant at bar urges most 
earnestly and vigorously that the records or 
evidence sought were not kept in the ordinary 
course of the business of operating a hospital 
nor did they relate to the hospitalization or 
treatment of a patient. The defendant argues, 
in other words, that before the exclusion of the 
last provision of the statute can apply the 
records or evidence sought must have been 
medical records kept in the ordinary course of 
the business of operating a hospital, or they 
must relate to the ordinary course of 
hospitalization or treatment of the patient. 
The defendant's argument continues that 
incident or risk management review reports, 
routine questions concerning falls, and 
interviews with nurses who may know 
something about a patient's fall are not 
medical records and are not kept in the 
ordinary course of the business of operating a 
hospital nor do they include facts or evidence 
relating to the hospitalization or treatment of 
a patient in the ordinary course of the 
hospitalization of a patient. Therefore, the 
defendant contends, such records should not be 
granted the immunity from privilege which 
was intended by the last sentence of this 
statute. 
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This argument, however, begs the question. 
What are, or should be, records kept in the 
ordinary course of treating a patient or 
operating a hospital with respect to patients, 
that is the ultimate question. The ordinary 
course of a hospital's function surely includes 
the prevention of accidents or mishaps to those 
who have been entrusted to its care. Charting 
the ordinary course of a patient's treatment 
would or should require description of events 
out of the ordinary that relate to a patient's 
health and well-being. As a health care 
provider, protection from further illness or 
injury is an inescapable component of treating 
a patient. 
To suggest that negligent acts or omissions 
are not a part of a patient's usual treatment 
and that, therefore, they should not be 
considered as part and parcel of delivering 
health care may be oxymoronic, as erudite 
counsel suggests, but such characterization 
does not thereby make the argument valid. It 
is false reasoning as the following analysis 
should demonstrate. The defendant advances 
this proposition: 
Premise: An accident is not part of a patient's 
usual treatment. 
Conclusion: Therefore any record concerning 
an accident, it not being usual or in the 
ordinary course of patient treatment, is 
privileged. 
*5 The premise may indeed be oxymoronic, 
i.e. self-contradictory. Causing additional 
injury by accident is certainly contradictory to 
the notion of usual treatment. But the fallacy 
in this argument exists in the definition of 
terms; confusion is created in stating the 
premise. It is not claimed, nor could it be 
reasonably suggested, that causing an 
accident is part of a patient's usual treatment; 
the contention is that the prevention of 
accident is, or should be, part of his usual 
treatment. 
Thus the smoke screen of oxymoronia 
beclouds the issue. The only oxymoronic 
element in this controversy is the statute itself 
(oxymoronic meaning a self-contradictory 
expression such as "cruel kindness"; but being 
oxymoronic does not settle an argument: 
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which thought prevails "cruelty" or 
"kindness"?) 
What could be more within the ordinary 
course of the treatment of a patient who has 
lost her leg than careful supervision that she 
not fall on her stump, that she not be left 
negligently unattended, that she be helped 
with due care when she shifts from chair to 
bed or from bed to walker, that her physical 
therapy be conducted with proper attention. 
Because a hospital may not choose to call a 
document a "medical record" or may contend 
that various reports are not maintained in the 
ordinary course of a hospital's business or a 
patient's treatment does not make it so. The 
ordinary course of a hospital's business or a 
patient's treatment is the welfare and safety 
of its patients. And any document that relates 
to that all-embracing concept comes, or should 
come, within the meaning of the last sentence 
of the statute in question, oxymoronic as it 
makes the entire section, except, as this court 
has indicated in its Johnson opinion, the 
precise proceedings and minutes of the true 
peer review committees where the free 
exchange of criticisms should not be hindered. 
The argument that all the field work, the 
incident reports, the questions concerning falls 
that might precede a peer review meeting, 
should be free from discovery (which 
admittedly is granted by the statutory 
language that "all communications 
provided to such committees" are privileged) 
must yield to the more compelling mandate of 
the statute's last sentence. Otherwise, all 
documents could become privileged simply by 
the committee requiring their production, or 
attaching* them to the minutes. As stated in 
Johnson: "Almost anything could come within 
such broad and limitless sweep." 
"ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION" MUST 
BE THE PREDOMINANT REASON OF 
CREATING A 
DOCUMENT; "NEED" FOR DISCOVERY IS 
A RELATIVE CONCEPT. 
If not privileged, then, within the meaning of 
the contradictory provisions of the statute in 
question, the defendant urges that nonetheless 
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they should not be discoverable since they 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation and 
are protected by the provisions of Rule 
4:l(bX3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
Here, again, a litigant can always claim that 
documents sought were made in "anticipation 
of litigation." In reality, when an untoward 
event has occurred to a patient in a hospital 
causing injury, hospital officials, keenly 
conscious of the litigious nature of the 
American character, will undertake an 
investigation to accumulate facts so as to be 
fully informed if claim is ultimately made. 
But such information is also sought in pursuit 
of the hospital's noble objectives of remedying 
procedures or policies that bring about 
accidents. The investigation is part of the 
hospital's program of quality control. 
*6 The injured patient, on the other hand, is 
at such an unfair advantage: one single 
individual, sick and weakly, pitted against a 
colossal corporate giant with staff and 
resources unlimited and personnel schooled in 
the techniques of avoiding or minimizing 
losses for claimed negligence. Already 
incapacitated and perhaps further damaged by 
the incident and at the complete mercy of the 
personnel from whom she seeks recovery and 
relief, she is hardly in position to undertake 
critical investigation of what happened. It is, 
after all, the search for truth that is the 
engagement at hand and if, as defendant's 
counsel volunteers, "The hospital's position is 
not motivated by a desire to hide the 
substantive contents of the reports, ..." then, 
especially since the incident reports are no 
longer available, their functional equivalents 
should be produced. It is, of course, the factual 
presentation of what happened that is 
discoverable; mental impressions, conclusions 
or opinions are not included. All factual 
statements and reports, therefore, that were 
obtained prior to the claimant's attorney's 
entrance on the scene (June 7, 1984), which 
include Documents No. 3, 4, and 5, should be 
discoverable, as the defendant has not 
sustained its burden of showing that they were 
predominantly made in anticipation of 
litigation. 
As to Document No. 1 (the Risk Management 
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Review Report) and Document No. 2 (Routine 
Questions of Claims Concerning Falls) 
prepared apparently after June 7, 1984, when 
the claimant's attorney made his first request 
(although the claimant's attorney in her brief 
at p. 8 represents that Document No. 2 was 
prepared on or about February 1, 1984) the 
court is satisfied that enough substantial need 
has been shown to require the production of 
these documents and that obtaining their 
substantial equivalent could not only not be 
obtained "without undue hardship" but could 
probably not be obtained at all. 
Document No. 6, the supplemental statement 
of Head Nurse Williams, even though 
prepared after the appearance of the 
claimant's attorney, should be considered and 
treated as an addendum to her original 
statement and therefore should be 
discoverable. 
As to Documents Nos. 7 and 8, statements of 
employees of the defendant that were obtained 
after the claimant's formal notice of an official 
claim on October 18, 1985, neither sufficient 
need nor hardship has been demonstrated to 
justify their disclosure. They were prepared, 
one nearly two years and the other more than 
two years after the events, and subsequent to 
the equivalent of instituting suit. 
Furthermore, they were obviously obtained at 
the behest of trial counsel and hence are more 
clearly a part of the attorney's work product. 
The claimant's need to disclose them is far 
less substantial; and her ability to obtain the 
recollection and statements of these witnesses 
are otherwise available without invasion of 
trial counsel's files. 
CONCLUSION: THE COURT'S FUNCTION 
IS TO BALANCE CONFLICTING 
INTERESTS AS FAIRLY 
AND JUSTLY AS SOCIETY'S CONSCIENCE 
MIGHT REQUIRE. 
*7 In the final analysis the critical test in 
resolving the dispute at issue is the fair and 
just balancing of conflicting interests. What 
are the benefits to be achieved in refusing 
disclosure against the harm to the claimant 
that might thereby result. The records sought 
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are not the pure peer review proceedings that 
public policy might justify in keeping secret. 
They are not the minutes of meetings during 
which self-criticism and fault-finding within 
the organization are encouraged. At issue 
basically are factual reports of several 
incidents that occurred while a patient of a 
hospital was undergoing treatment. Disclosing 
the contents of these reports for discovery 
purposes- since the hospital has nothing to 
hide-should not cause undue harm to the 
hospital. It should not-and will not-
discourage nor frustrate their continuing and 
self-serving efforts to improve the delivery of 
health care. On the other hand, a woman 
whose leg had been amputated has allegedly 
sustained additional injury to the stump of her 
severed limb while at the mercy of and under 
the control of the defendant hospital and its 
personnel. 
The issue of the moment is not was the 
hospital negligent; that is reserved for a later 
day. The present question involves the search 
for the truth, for the factual, objective 
development of what took place. And the 
ultimate presentation of the evidence that 
these reports might provoke, it must be noted, 
is not to be submitted before a lay jury— at 
least not at this time. No lawsuit has yet been 
started. We are before a medical review panel, 
at the request of the defendant, composed of 
doctors and lawyers who unlike the usual trier 
of facts are commissioned to seek out those 
facts. One would assume that the panel would 
want access to all records and documents 
available. Certainly, the climate before a 
medical review panel is considerably different 
than the litigation pit of a trial. 
As observed by the author of the annotation 
in 15 A.L.R.3d 1446 "Scope of Defendant's 
Duty of Pretrial Discovery in Medical 
Malpractice Action": 
A majority of courts that have spoken on the 
question have allowed the plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice action quite liberal 
discovery, many specifically stating that the 
difficulty in discovering evidence in a 
malpractice action makes it all the more 
important that the plaintiff be allowed to 
examine the defendant, especially as to those 
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facts that are solely within his knowledge. 
When the input by one party to an issue in 
dispute has been so handicapped at the outset 
because of the conditions of health and the 
location and environment in which the 
incidents occurred and when measured against 
the relative investigative strengths of the 
parties, natural notions of fair play lean 
heavily toward opening rather than closing 
doors that might balance the contest. The 
potential harm to the claimant in refusing the 
discovery sought far outweighs the benefit to 
the defendant in maintaining their secrecy. 
*8 Considering all the factors herein 
discussed, therefore, it is the judgment of this 
court, serving as chairman of this panel, that 
the claimant's request as to the production of 
Document Nos. 1-6 should be granted, but 
denied as to Document Nos. 7 and 8. To such 
extent the defendant's objections are 
overruled. 
10 Va. Cir. 430, 1988 WL 626030 (Va. Cir. 
Ct.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Circuit Court of Virginia, Loudoun County. 
Betty Mangano 
v. 
Michael A. Kavanaugh, M.D. and Loudoun 
Hospital Center 
LAW # 13357. 
January 21, 1993. 
*1 On , this Court heard counsels' arguments 
on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery. At 
that time, the Court ruled on all of plaintiffs 
discovery requests with the exception of those 
relating to the production of information to 
which a privilege is asserted pursuant to ' 
8.01-581.17, Code of Virginia. Because of the 
differing rulings among the circuit courts in 
Virginia regarding the scope of the privilege 
encompassed by ' 8.01-581.17, the Court took 
these discovery requests under advisement. 
Thomas D. Home, Judge. 
On January 13, 1993, counsel informed the 
Court that the parties had settled all claims 
and that the matter would not be going to 
trial. Although this settlement makes 
plaintiffs discovery requests moot, the Court, 
having taken the matter under advisement, 
believes it would be appropriate and beneficial 
to advise counsel how it would have ruled on 
the protection to be granted under ' 8.01-
581.17 in medical malpractice cases. 
Section 8.01-581.17 of the Virginia Code 
protects from the discovery process: 
"The proceedings, minutes, records, and 
reports of any medical staff committee, 
utilization review committee, or other 
committee as specified in ' 8.01-581.16 , 
together with all communications, both oral 
and written, originating in or provided to such 
committees...." 
The committees specified by ' 8.01-581.16 
include: 
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"... such committee, board, group, commission 
or other entity which functions primarily to 
review, evaluate, or make recommendations 
on (i) the duration of patient stays in health 
care facilities, (ii) the professional services 
furnished with respect to the medical or dental 
necessity for such services, (iii) the purpose of 
promoting the most efficient use of available 
health care facilities and services, (iv) the 
adequacy or quality of professional services, 
(v) the competency and qualifications for 
professional staff privileges, or (vi) the 
reasonableness or appropriateness of charges 
made by or on behalf of health care facilities; 
provided that such entity has been established 
pursuant to federal or state law or regulation, 
or pursuant to Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals requirements, or 
established and duly constituted by one or 
more public or licensed private hospitals...." 
The differing opinions from the circuit courts 
regarding ' 8.01-581.17 have come in the 
interpretation of what constitutes 
"proceedings, minutes, records, and reports" of 
the covered committees as well as the intent of 
the legislature is limiting discovery of "all 
communications, both oral and written, 
originating in or provided to such 
committees". Some courts have taken a broad 
approach to the privilege granted by ' 8.01-
581.17 and have held that communications 
such as a hospital's policy and procedure 
manual are privileged from disclosure, as well 
as hospital "Incident Reports" regarding a 
particular patient's claim of injury resulting 
from medical treatment. See e.g., Hedgepeth 
v. Jesudian, 15 Va.Cir. 352 (1989) (discovery 
permitted as to guidelines but not as to 
reports); Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va.Cir. 127 
(1988); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va.Cir. 126 
(1987). On the other hand, some courts have 
taken a more narrow approach and have held 
that such communications are not privileged 
from the discovery process. See e.g., 
Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va.Cir. 221 (1988) 
(see above); Sawyer v. Childress, 12 Va.Cir. 
184 (1988); Benedict v. Community Hospital, 
10 Va.Cir. 430 (1988) (medical malpractice 
review panel); Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial 
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Hospitals, 9 Va.Cir. 196 (1987); Atkinson v. 
Thomas, 9 Va.Cir. 21 (1986). 
*2 This Court is of the opinion that ' 8.01-
581.17 should be read broadly and that 
protection should be accorded all 
communications originating from or provided 
to such medical committees. The Court 
believes this broad approach is consistent with 
the objective of the statute which is to 
encourage health care providers "to adopt 
policies and procedures which will provide the 
public with the highest degree of care 
recognized by the medical and scientific 
communities at any given time." Francis v. 
McEntee, 10 Va.Cir. 126, 128 (1987). In 
enacting ' 8.01-581.17, the Virginia General 
Assembly recognized that in order to achieve 
this goal there must be open and frank 
discussions "where criticisms are actually 
encouraged and mistakes or deficiencies 
aggressively exposed...." Johnson v. Roanoke 
Memorial Hospitals, Inc., 9 Va.Cir. 196, 198 
(1987). In addition, the legislature recognized 
the need for privacy in order to promote the 
type of vigorous debate where such open 
exchanges could be made without fear of 
public disclosure. Indeed, without protection 
from disclosure such discussions would 
probably be meaningless and without 
substance. Thus, it is the Court's opinion that 
the intent of the legislator's in enacting ' 8.01-
581.17 was to afford the utmost protection to 
such communications and thus make them 
privileged from the discovery process. 
The Plaintiff has not at this stage of the 
proceedings demonstrated "good cause arising 
from extraordinary circumstances" which 
would justify a disclosure of those matters to 
which the privilege is asserted. Similarly, the 
Court need not at this time address the issue 
of relevancy of specific discovery requests. 
Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342 
(1983). 
Addressing each of plaintiffs discovery 
requests to which defendants claimed a 
privilege under ' 8.01-518.17, the Court would 
have ruled that as to certain matters 
requested the privilege has been properly 
asserted ' 8.01-581.17 and thus would have 
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim 
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denied discovery as to such privileged matters. 
The Court's comments on each request is as 
follows: 
"Interrogatory 9. State completely and in 
detail your procedure for inquiry, 
investigation or review of complaints or 
reports of potential or actual malpractice by 
either staff physicians or physicians granted 
privileges in the hospital; and if such 
procedure has been modified or amended since 
August, 1986, state precisely the former 
procedure and the modified or amended 
procedure, giving the effective date of 
modification or amendment." 
This request essentially calls for the 
production of the hospital's policy and 
procedure manual detailing how medical 
malpractice claims are investigated and 
handled by the hospital. As noted above, the 
circuit courts are split on the particular issue 
of the discovery of such internal manuals. 
Those courts holding that such manuals are 
discoverable rationalize that they are merely 
the end result of confidential committee 
proceedings and, as such, do not merit the 
same concern for protection from public 
scrutiny. See e.g., Johnson v. Roanoke 
Memorial Hospitals, supra at 199 (the 
"depersonalized manuals of procedure which 
have been shorn of individualized criticisms" 
are not protected from discovery). 
*3 This Court believes, however, that such 
policy manuals are encompassed by the 
privilege under ' 8.01-581.17. Such manuals, 
while they may be the end-product of 
confidential proceedings, are still 
communications originating from a committee 
whose function it is to review, evaluate, or 
make recommendations on health care 
facilities and services. As such, they should be 
given the protection accorded other 
confidential communications. 
"Interrogatory 10. Identify separately ... all 
communication, written and oral, from you to 
either Michael A. Kavanagh, M.D. or Paul L. 
Weiner, M.D. or to you from either of them 
relating to or in any way connected with the 
possibility of a claim or the actual claim by 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. ^*~ 
Wesfl&w 
Not Reported in S.E.2d 
(Cite as: 1993 WL 945920, *3 (Va. Cir. Ct.)) 
Plaintiff that is the subject of this litigation; 
and identify fully all persons who were 
present when each such communication was 
made." 
The Court believes this request clearly falls 
within the scope of the privilege encompassed 
by ' 8.01-581.17 as communications 
originating from or provided to a committee 
(formed under ' 8.01-581.16) whose function it 
is to review "the adequacy or quality of 
professional services." As such, these 
communications are protected from discovery. 
This request may also be seeking the 
production of the hospital's "Incident Report" 
(or its functional equivalent) as it relates to 
Plaintiffs claim against defendants. The 
courts which have held that these reports are 
discoverable have rationalized that they fall 
within the exception of' 8.01- 581.17 - that is, 
they are "... records kept with respect to any 
patient in the ordinary course of business of 
operating a hospital...." See e.g., Benedict v. 
Community Hospital, supra. However, this 
Court believes that such communications are 
clearly part of the confidential process 
envisioned by ' 8.01-581.17 and must be 
protected from disclosure. Indeed, a hospital's 
review and evaluation of a malpractice claim 
is exactly the type of communication most 
deserving of frank and open discussion 
without fear of public disclosure. To the extent 
that plaintiffs request sought such 
communications, it would have been denied. 
"Interrogatory 18. State fully and in detail 
each and every inquiry, investigation and/or 
review of either Michael A. Kavanagh, M.D. 
or Paul L. Weiner, M.D., including without 
limitation all relevant dates, circumstances, 
findings, recommendations, reprimands or 
other actions." 
The Court believes that this request also 
clearly falls within the scope of the privilege 
encompassed by ' 8.01-581.17 as 
communications originating from or provided 
to a committee (formed under ' 8.01-581.16) 
whose function it is to review "the adequacy or 
quality of professional services," as well as 
"the competency and qualifications for 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim 
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professional staff privileges." As such, these 
communications are protected from discovery. 
*4 "Interrogatory 19. Identify each and every 
person by name, employer, profession, address 
and telephone number that was involved in 
any way with the actual claim or possible 
claim by Plaintiff ... or any inquiry, 
investigation or review referred to in 
Interrogatory 18 above; and for each person, 
state their role and the relevant events with 
which they were connected." 
"Interrogatory 20. Identify separately ... each 
and every document produced or generated in 
connection with any of the events or persons 
referred to in Interrogatories 17, 18 and 19 
above; and for each such document, identify 
fully the person who has possession, custody or 
control thereof." 
To the extent that these requests seek 
underlying documentation to interrogatories 
previously ruled privileged, the Court would 
rule that these requests would also be denied. 
30 Va. Cir. 66,1993 WL 945920 (Va. Cir. Ct.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IONA ADAM, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, et al. 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 020910871 
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having considered the Motion and the 
Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court enters the following 
decision: 
The present Motion seeks to compel Defendants' production of 
incident reports requested from the Plaintiffs. In denying the 
request, the Defendant asserted that "if such documents exist, they 
are not discoverable and are privileged pursuant to § 26-25-3, Utah 
Code Ann. (1996)." This statutory provision, otherwise known as 
the care review privilege, "privileges only documents prepared 
specifically to be submitted for review purposes" and cannot be 
read so broadly as extending to all "documents that might or could 
be used in the review process." Benson ex rel. Benson v. IHC 
ADAM V. SLRMC PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
Hospitals, 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993). Utah law is clear that 
the party invoking the privilege must produce evidence establishing 
its applicability to the documents in question. See id., at 538. 
Accordingly, Plaintifffs Motion to Compel is hereby GRANTED. 
Defendant is hereby ordered to produce either the incident reports 
as requested, or evidence that the incident reports were created 
"specifically to be submitted for review purposes." This 
constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters referenced 
herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this day of October, 2003. 
Judge WILLIAM B. ;£OHL. 
District Court Judge 
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